The International Gold Standard Reinterpreted, 1914-1934 by William Adams Brown, Jr.
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National
Bureau of Economic Research
Volume Title: The International Gold Standard Reinterpreted, 1914-1934





Chapter Title: Book one: Part II The Effect of the War on the Form
of the International Gold Standard
Chapter Author: William Adams Brown, Jr.
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c5938




The Sacrifice of Some of the External Forms of the
Gold Standard in Order to Preserve Others
The crisis of 1914, by suddenly reversing the distribution of
international credit, laid bare in a remarkable way the finan-
cial anatomy of the pre-war international gold standard sys-
tem. It demonstrated the dependence of that system upon the
regular and uninterrupted operation of the financial machin-
ery of the City of London, and showed the difficulties that
arise when an attempt is made to force gold to serve as a
balancing item in international payments when credit is dis-
organized. The crisis caused moratoria, suspensions of specie
payments, and legal or de facto gold export embargoes in
many countries. Nevertheless it did not break down the inter-
national gold standard completely or all at once. It inaugurated
a gradual and piecemeal alteration in the external forms of
the gold standard within individual countries. Since the gold
standard up to this time had the attributes of an international
convention simply because it existed simultaneously as a
domestic institution within the various countries adhering to
it, these internal changes greatly modified but did not wholly
destroy its functioning as an international convention. Conse-
quently no simple statement with respect to the breakdown
of the gold standard during the war can be true.1
It is a popular belief expressed in many American writings that during the
war the United States alone remained on the gold standard while all other
countries abandoned it. Writing in 1932B.M. Anderson, Jr. said, for example:
has been no time in the past thirty-six years when there has been
justifiable ground for doubt as to our ability to maintain the gold standard
in its full integrity.. In1914wewere obliged to close our stock exchange
to prevent an avalanche of foreign selling of American securities in our
]narket, but the question of the maintenance of our gold standard, even
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The Gold Standard, Form and Substance
Inorderto establish the exact sense in which it is true to say
that various countries 'went off' gold during the war, it is
helpful to distinguish carefully between the external form of
the gold standard and its substance.
By the external form of the international gold standard
we mean:
i)thejuridical concept that gold is the monetary standard of a
given country
2)the legal systems established in countries in which this juridi-
cal concept exists to give formal expression to it
8)the domestic banking regulations necessarily implied by the
existence of these legal systems
4)the code of financial practice and conduct necessary to give
these legal systems their intended effect
and finally
5)the system of foreign exchange rates established as a result of
the simultaneous existence of such legal systems in several coun-
tries.
By the substance of the international gold standard we
though virtually all the rest of the world abandoned it, did not arise at all." *
Yetit is difficult, from either a legal or an administrative viewpoint, to find
vital differences between the gold standard in England and America during
the period of America's participation in the war. The date when England
'returned to gold' after the war is a landmark in world history, but it is very
difficult to determine the date when England left the gold standard to which
she returned in 1925.Theonly generalizations that really allow for the com-
plexities of the situation are of the following type: "For the greater part of
the war substantially all the commercial countries of the world were more
or less off the gold monetary standard." **Suchstatements certainly invite
a more precise answer to the question of how much of the gold standard did
survive the war.
*ChaseEconomic Bulletin, Nov. io, 1932,p.(our italics). Cf. also the
opening passages of L. A. Rufener's textbook, Money and Banking (Hough.
ton, Muffin, 1934).
**C.J. Bullock, J. H. Williams, and R. S. Tucker: 'The Balance of Trade
in the United States,' Review of Economic Statistics, Vol. I, 1919,p.239(our
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mean the whole institutional pattern of trade and of finance
that breathes life into these forms of law and practice, and
that works out its contribution to economic progress through
them. In the pre-war world this was the London-centered sys-
tem of international finance based upon British predomi-
nance in international trade.
The Retention of the Juridical Concept of
Gold as Standard
The modifications made during and after the crisis of 1914 in
the monetary systems and banking laws of most countries did
not in general alter the legal conception that gold was the
ultimate standard of value. Unlike silver after 1870, gold was
in no sense demonetized. From the legal point of view the
theory of the gold standard was maintained and the utmost
change accomplished by law was the temporary suspension
of certain rights and obligations that might tend to dissipate
gold reserves and force a genuine abandonment of the gold
standard as a juridical concept as well as an economic mechan-
isnl.2
The Minimum Change in Legal Form Consistent
with the Necessary Changes in Practice
Because the gold standard was maintained in legal theory
every country sought to accomplish the changes in financial
practice made necessary by war-time conditions with a mini-
mum change in legal form. This may be seen clearly by a
brieE review of legal enactments concerning gold in the prin-
cipaJi countries.
2Thepersistence of a rigid judicial conception of gold as standard is demon-
strateci by many court decisions after the war. It was then responsible in large
measure for the dedine in the authority of law in Central Europe, for de-
cisions to the effect that 'a mark was a mark' long after the mark had greatly
depreciated in value were repugnant to the innate sense of justice of the popu-
lation. For a general discussion of the governing principles of law and court
decisions on this matter cf. F. A. Mann, The Legal Aspects of Money (London,
Oxford University Press, 1938), Part I.30 BREAKDOWN
The Legal Framework of the International Gold Standard
during the War
The gold standard exists as an international legal convention
when
i)the monetary units of the several countries adhering to it are
defined as fixed weights of gold;
2)these monetary units, and all other means of payment in the
several countries expressed in terms of these units, and gold bul-
lion, are freely convertible into one another at the rate estab-
lished by the legal definitions of the units by
a)free melting, free coinage, and the redemption of notes in
gold; or by
b)the establishment of some agency that is obliged to buy
and sell gold at fixed prices in unlimited amounts;
orby
c) some combination of (a) and (b);
3) when no restriction is placed upon either the import or the
export of gold.
UNITED KINGDOM
The legal system embodying these requirements in the United
Kingdom came through the war virtually unscathed. The
definition of the gold content of the sovereign has remained
unchanged until the day of writing (June '939). The legal
right of the citizen to bring gold bullion to the Mint for
coinage into sovereigns and to demand the redemption of
Bank of England notes in coin at the rate established by the
legal definition of the sovereign was not withdrawn until
the passage of the Gold Standard Act of 1925. Until that time
the cost of obtaining gold from the Bank of England by the
redemption of notes, expressed in shillings and pence, was
77 s. d. per ounce 11/12 fine. This equivalent is referred
to in these studies and in common parlance as the Bank of
England selling price for gold, for in practical effect though
not in form it was a selling price. By the Act of 1925 this wasPRESERVATION OF EXTERNAL FORMS 31
recognized in terms, for that Act introduced a limitation in
the legal right of redemption, restricting it to redemption in
gold bullion in amounts of not less than 400 ounces troy of
fine gold (L1,699), and directed the Bank of England to sell
such gold bullion for legal tender moneys at the price of 77 S.
101/2 d. per ounce 1 1/12 fine. As a necessary corollary of this
change the Act of 1925 restricted the right of free coinage of
bullion into sovereigns at the Mint to the Bank of England.
Not until the Gold Standard (Amendment) Act of 1931 was
the c:onvertibility of Bank of England notes into gold legally
withdrawn, and even then the selling price of the Bank was
not officially changed. The obligation laid upon the Bank by
Section IV of the Peel Act to purchase all gold offered at 77 S.
9 d. per ounce remained in force without alteration or amend-
meni: until the passage of the Currency and Bank Notes Act
of lc)39, when it was repealed. During the war the right to
import gold was not legally impaired, but gold produced in
the Empire was purchased in the countries of origin by the
government through the Bank of England at prices varying
from 77 S. 9 d. to 77 s.ioi,4 d. per ounce, and in igi6 im-
porters of other gold were requested to sell all gold imported
to the Bank of England at its buying price.3 The inability to
any other buyer with imported gold acted in the same
manner as a legal restriction on imports, though it was not
one in legal form. The first legal restriction onright to
export gold was imposed by an Order in Council issued on
April 1, 1919, at the same time that the import restriction
was lifted.4 Aside from the impounding of gold imports, the
only break in the legal system governing the adherence of the
United Kingdom to the gold standard as an international con-
vention actually made during the war was the prohibition of
gold melting under the Defense of the Realm Act in Decem-
ber igi6.
and Goldsmid's Annual Circular, 1919, p.4.
4Boarc1 of Trade Journal, April 3, 1919,p. 434.32 BREAKDOWN
CONTINENTAL BELLIGERENTS
The suspension of specie payments at the central banks of
Germany, Austria-Hungary, Russia, and France, and the im-
position of gold export embargoes by these countries has al-
ready been referred to in Chapter i. The smaller powers of
Central Europe followed suit, and in many of these countries
the transport of gold even within their own borders was pro-
hibited. Because of her creditor position France was able to
postpone her gold export embargo until July 1915, and Italy
is not included in the list because, before the war, the lira was
not convertible into gold at a fixed ratio, but was kept rela-
tively stable by the efforts of the Bank of Italy and the Minis-
try of Finance. In considering the vitality of the idea of gold
as standard during the war it is important to emphasize that
these measures represented the breakdown of a part only of
the legal framework embodying the gold standard in the con-
tinental belligerent countries. The rest was preserved intact.
The definition of the gold content of the standard coins of
France, Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Russia remained un-
changed. The obligation of the central banks and treasuries
of these countries to purchase gold at fixed prices based upon
the mint price was not altered, and no restrictions were
placed upon the import of gold.
NEUTRAL COUNTRIES
At the outbreak of the war the Dutch government placed an
embargo on gold exports and authorized the Netherlands
Bank to suspend specie payments. Argentina, likewise, im-
posed an embargo on gold exports on August 2, 1914, and on
August 8 made the notes of the Caja de Conversion legal
tender and established gold depositories at the Argentine
embassies abroad, providing that gold held in these deposi-
tories was to count as part of the gold holdings of the Caja.
Such measures were not, the most common form of
interference with legal goTd standard arrangements in neutralPRESERVATION OF EXTERNAL FORMS 33
countries, which was, rather, to place obstacles in the way of
gold imports. Argentina, herself, for example, changed her
gold policy when her foreign gold deposits began to increase
unduly. In the summer of 1915 the Caja refused to accept gold
at its foreign depositories except at a discount of i ½to2 per
cent plus a deduction for the cost of shipment to Argentina olf
2 per cent. A similar change of policy took place in Holland.
When, in 1915,Dutchimports began to fall more rapidly
than Dutch exports, and capital payments were heavily in
favor of Holland, gold began to move toward Holland in
large volume in spite of obstacles in the countries of
The Netherlands Bank then adopted the policy of not pur-
chasing any gold, or accepting any deposits of gold abroad
unless it was fully informed of the origins and purposes of
these shipments and considered them to be in the national
interest. The Bank was able to do this without fresh legisla-
tion as it was not bound either by law or by its statutes to buy
all gold offered, but maintained a fixed buying price for gold
as a matter of policy. This gold repulsion policy was
continued in 19 16,6 but in the later stages of the war Holland
was often forced to accept payment for her exports in gold
because no other means of payment was available, and she in
turn tendered gold to other countries in payment for Dutch im-
ports. These offers created difficulties with the Scandinavian
countries which were themselves practicing a gold repulsion
policy.7 On February 8, 1916 the Swedish Riksbank was re-
lieved of its obligation to give 2478.8 kr. for 1 kilogram of
gold, and free coinage was suspended. For Sweden therefore
to accept payment for goods in gold required a regular politi-
"It is certainly remarkable that the export of goid took place quite regularly
and practically without difficulty from those countries which had prodaimed
a general prohibition on the export of gold while nearly allshipmentsto the
Netherlands of gold from America, the country which had not prohibited the
export, were exposed to serious obstades." Netherlands Bank, Annual Report,
1915—16,p.15.
6 Ibid.,pp. 15—17;1916—17, p.16.
7lbid., 1917—18,pp.12—13.34 BREAKDOWN
cal treaty, such as that concluded between the Bank of the
Netherlands and the Swedish Riksbank for the payment of
Dutch purchases of Swedish coal in gold. Gold as a commodity
was not absolutely prohibited from importation into Sweden,
but its entry into the monetary system was prevented. In prin-
ciple, Denmark and Norway went along with Sweden and
agreed to pass similar measures when it became necessary.8
Spain also was reluctant to accept gold. The buying price
of the Bank of Spain for foreign gold coins was temporarily
reduced, only 4.90 pesetas being given for the American gold
dollar in 1917insteadof the mint price of 5.18 pesetas.
Ti-fE UNITED STATES
In the United States, the country commonly regarded as com-
ing through the war with the gold banner flying more
proudly than anywhere else, there was no change in the legal
definition of the gold dollar, and the obligation placed upon
the Secretary of the Treasury by the Gold Standard Act of
igoo to keep all the moneys of the United States at par with
gold was not changed, though the mechanism for accomplish-
ing this was altered by the passage of the Federal Reserve Act.
The import of gold also was not restricted but in September
1917theright to export gold was limited to those who could
obtain licenses from the Federal Reserve Board acting with
the consent of the Secretary of the Treasury.
The International Gold Standard as a Code of Practice during
the War
The retreat from the international gold standard as a code of
practice was far more complete than the retreat from it as a
legal system, especially in Great Britain. England did not 'sus-
pend specie payments' during the war, nor did she place an
embargo on the export of gold. In practice, however, both
domestic convertibility and free export were abandoned. Dur-
ing the early months of the war while England was insistent
8Blankart,op. cit., pp. 55—9.PRESERVATION OF EXTERNAL FORMS 35
that the obligations of the international gold standard be
lived up to by her debtors, in particular by the United States,
and that debts due her should be paid in gold, the position
of the exchanges rendered the Bank of England immune from
a foreign drain on its reserves. The attitude of the British
public and of the banks saved it from a domestic drain after
the first days of the crisis. As the situation gradually changed,
however, increasing pressure was brought to bear upon those
who wished to redeem notes in gold by an appeal to their
patriotism and by a rigid inquisition into the purposes and
motives of everyone who presented notes for redemption.
This finally amounted in practice to a refusal of the right of
conversion except in a few cases in which the purpose was
purely and simply to assert the holder's legal rights. Early in
the sterling-dollar rate fell for the first time below the
peace-time gold export point to the United States. In Febru-
ary the Treasury took steps to place difficulties in the way of
redemption of Currency Notes. During most of 1915thede-
preciation of sterling in terms of the dollar offered on the
surface a substantial motive for a demand for gold for export,
but in January 1916 the pound was pegged at 4.767/16 where
it was held during the rest of the war. At that rate the profit
motive, in the absence of other impediments, was probably
insufficient to have resulted in the presentation of notes for
redemption at the Bank of England to obtain gold for export
to the United States.9 The incentive to the redemption of
notes was further lessened by the issue of regulations under
DORA on December 5, igi6 prohibiting the melting of gold
coin or its use otherwise than as a currency. It was reduced to
zero by the regulation of May i8, 1918, which made it illegal
to buy or sell gold at a premium within England.
These piecemeal measures were not, however, the major
departure of England from adherence to the international
The rates of insurance on gold were fixed by the British government at a
rate so high that gold exports were unprofitable with the exchange at 4.767Ae.
S. E. Harris, Monetary Problems of the British Empire (Macmillan, 1931),pp.
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gold standard as a code of practice during the war. London
ceased to be a free gold market not because insurance was un-
obtainable, or because the holder of a five pound note could
not get gold for it, or because the holder of a sovereign could
not legally melt it, but primarily because the bullion market
did not carry out gold transactions. The failure of the market
to do so was at first defended on the ground of lack of reci-
procity upon the part of other nations. In the summer of
1915 E. L. Franklin of Samuel Montagu and Company gave
this explanation:
"notwithstanding that there is no prohibition placed on the ex-
port of gold to neutral countries, no bank or banker can be found
who will avail himself of the benefits accruing from such trans-
actions because it is the general opinion that it is against the in-
terests of this country for gold to leave England as long as other
governments do not allow gold exports from their country." 10
Underwar-time conditions the gold from new production
coming on the London market would soon have been used up
by shipments to neutrals and would have proved a very weak
'first line of defense' for the Bank of England gold reserves.
Gold embargoes on the continent would have rendered quite
impossible the repetition of the experience of 1907 when a
heavy loss of gold to America was offset by the exercise of
England's 'pull' over the continental exchanges. The impor-
tance of protecting the reserves was not called in question, for
England was not felt to be 'off' the gold standard. Conse-
quently, the 'gold income' of Great Britain was not made
available for distribution to the higest bidder, but was re-
tained in England. The Bank of England reserves were pro-
tected from demands from the market whether based upon
the exchange rates or not.1'
10Kirkaldy,Credit, Industry., and the War (London, Pitman, 1915),p.249
(our italics)Cf. the attitude of certain gold bloc countries, especially the
Netherlands after September 1931.
11Thiswar-time practice of suspending the functioning of the bullion market
was unobtrusively followed during the difficult times preceding the suspension
of the gold standard in September ig3i. Cf. Ch. 27, pp. 1013—4.PRESERVATION OF EXTERNAL 37
After the United States became a belligerent, difficulties
were placed in the way of the redemption of American paper
money in gold similar to those in England. For example, the
writer knows of a holder of a Federal Reserve note who was
obliged to carry his demand for its redemption in accordance
with its terms up to one of the highest Treasury officials be-
fore he could enforce his rights. The export of gold, as al-
ready stated, was subject to license from September 1917to
June 1919.
Inboth Great Britain and the United States, therefore, by
a combination of legal enactment, administrative control, and
private practice, the fulfillment of two of the cardinal re-
quirements of the gold standard as a formal legal institution,
namely, interconvertibility of notes and gold and free inter-
national movement of gold, were suspended, as they had been
by the continental belligerents by outright suspension of
specie payments and embargoes on the export of gold, and in
neutral countries in varying degree by limitations on the right
of free coinage and interferences with the import of gold. The
statement, however, that these measures took either the be!-
ligerents who interfered with the export of gold or the
neutrals who interfered with its import off the gold standard
must be carefully qualified.
The Objectives of the Changes in Gold Standard Legal Rules
and Gold Standard Practice
Every belligerent country was forced to draw the physical re-
sources for waging war from every available source both at
home and abroad. The means of supporting civilian popula-
tions had to be provided from resources, domestic and for-
eign, that had been greatly depleted by the use and destruc-
tion of wealth for war purposes. The resulting unprecedented
domestic and international diversion of productive powers
into new channels and transfer of ownership and control of
made credit expansion a necessity. Because of the
world-wide distribution of the physical resources consecrated38 BREAKDOWN
to the purposes of war, this credit expansion was spread over
the world of neutrals as well as over the world of belligerents
(cf. Ch. 4). Every country directly affected by the war was
also faced by another requirement of war finance, hardly less
impelling: the maintenance of the confidence of its people
in the 'soundness' of its money and of its banking system. This
confidence was fostered by the preservation, as far as possible,
of the traditional system of exchange rates established under
the pre-war international gold standard. Had the gold re-
sources of the belligerent countries with weak exchanges been
dispersed, it would have been difficult to obtain the credits
and mobilize the securities that were the main means of main-
taining these rates. Confidence was fostered also by the preser-
vation of something like the relationship between published
gold reserves and the volume of notes and of deposit credits
that had long been familiar before the war. Even when it was
impossible to preserve these familiar ratios, confidence in the
currency and in the banks was promoted and preserved, in
surprising degree, merely by the continued presence of the
physical volume of gold held in central banks and treasuries
before the war. Every country rejoiced in its successes and was
alarmed by its failures in keeping intact these familiar land-
marks of financial 'soundness' and thus preserving in the
minds of the people the conviction that the gold standard was
still in being in their own country, or, at worst, was merely
temporarily suspended.
Every country therefore struggled to preserve as far as pos-
sible the pre-war gold standard forms. Some parts of the pre-
war legal system relating to gold were maintained by most
countries throughout the war, notably the obligation placed
on central banks and treasuries to buy all gold offered at a
fixed price. Prohibition of gold export and inconvertibility of
currencies gave to those in control of financial policy freedom
in the choice of means by which to protect and increase gold
reserves—the outward and visible symbol of the existence of
the gold standard as a domestic institution—and to perpetu-PRESERVATION OF EXTERNAL FORMS 39
ate, as far as possible, the pre-war system of exchange rates—
the outward and visible symbol of the existence of the gold
standard as an international system. It is a paradox that dur-
ing the war countries 'went off' gold in order to preserve to
the maximum possible degree the psychological and economic
advantages of these two great traditional characteristics of
the gold standard.
The four major objectives of the retreat from fulfilling the
legal obligations and banking codes of practice traditionally
requi:red of countries on the gold standard were to
i)maintainunimpaired the juridical concept of gold as a mone-
tary standard;
2)carry forward until more normal times the essential legal
framework of the institution so that it could be easily restored to
full operation in time of peace;
3)preserve as far as possible the place of gold in the banking
systems of gold standard countries, even if only as a confidence-
inspLring factor;
4)preserve as far as possible the traditional system of exchange
rates defined by the system of mint pars existing in 1914.
Theseobjectives were all in one way or another associated
with an effort to preserve rather than to destroy the gold
standard as a social institution. It is therefore fundamentally
true to say that during the war some of the external forms of
the gold standard were abandoned in order to preserve others.
Major Characteristics of Gold Distribution
during the War
As a result of the extraordinary situation we have described
as the abandonment of some of the external forms of the gold
stancEard in order to preserve others, the distribution of gold
during the war had four major characteristics: gold concen-
tration, gold payment, gold arbitrage, and gold repulsion.
Gold Concentration
In order to preserve the nominal place of gold in their mone-
tary and banking systems, when these were subject to strong40 BREAKDOWN
inflationary influences, and at the same time to maintain
their exchanges as nearly as possible in their pre-war relation
to other currencies, the governments of belligerent countries
felt under heavy pressure to accumulate gold from every pos-
sible source. The suspension of specie payments and actual
or de facto gold export embargoes left them free to pursue
an intensive policy of gold accumulation and gold concen-
tration. This was of two main types:
i)the accumulation of gold from new production, its with-
drawal from circulation and from private banks, and its concen-
tration in the hands of central banks and treasuries
2)the concentration of gold in the hands of the principal finan-
cial powers in the two belligerent groups as a pledge for advances
to their allies.
In this process Great Britain was the most important single
factor.
GOLD ACCUMULATION AND CONCENTRATION IN ENGLAND
For reasons already discussed, England was able to draw gold
from all over the world at the outbreak of the war. In addi-
tion, as head of the British Empire she enjoyed peculiar ad-
vantages in the war-time hunt for gold. She was able to ar-
range for the use of gold held in London by Empire coun-
tries, such as the £8 million of the Egyptian gold reserve
under the control of the International Debt Commission that
was deposited in London, and to influence the movement of
gold to or from the Indian gold reserve. Far more important
were the arrangements made in South Africa, Australia, and
India to ensure a steady flow of new gold into the British
government's hands. Early in the war an agreement was made
giving the Bank of England the exclusive right to purchase
the product of the: South African mines at 77 s. 9 d. per
ounce, and measures were taken in South Africa to prevent
production from falling in spite of rising costs and a fixed
price for the output.'2 The Australian government placed an
12W.A.Brown, Jr., England and the New Gold Standard, 1919—1926(London.PRESERVATION OF EXTERNAL FORMS 41
officia.l embargo on the export of gold, but newly produced
Australian gold was purchased by the Bank of England in
Australia at 77 S. 10½ d. per ounce. This inward flow of Em-
pire gold was protected from Indian demand by requiring
all gold imported into India after June 1917 to be sold to
the government at a price that did not recognize any depreci-
ation of sterling in terms of gold and therefore did not effec-
tively compete with the bid of the Bank of England (cf. Ch.
g), then the only buyer of gold in England. These imperial
policies were based upon the theory that England was still
'on' the gold standard.
Moreover, since England's position as middleman in the
purclaase of war supplies for her allies increased the difficulty
of supporting the sterling-dollar exchange, it was arranged
that large parts of the gold reserves of France, Russia, and
Italy should be sent to England. The first Russian gold ship-
ment to London was made in October As early as
April 1915 the Bank of France sent £20 million of gold to
the :Bank of England, as part of a transaction by which the
French Treasury borrowed £62 million from the British
Treasury. This gold was actually sold to the Bank of England.
In 1916 and 1917 much larger sums were obtained on the
basis of a 'loan' of gold to the Bank of England, and the item
'gold held abroad' first appeared on the balance sheet of the
Bank of France.'4 England also acted as middleman on a large
King, 1929),pp.23—4; this matter has also been treated by C. J. Smit in an
unpublished manuscript.
Theitem 'gold held abroad' appeared on the balance sheet of the Russian
State Bank in November 1914.Thefigures under this head were partly fic-
titious, as British credits were treated'gold abroad' by the Bank. S.S.
Katznellenbaum, Russian Currency and Banking, 1914—1924(London,King,
1925),pp.52 if.
'4Whether these shipments involved a transfer of ownership of the gold was
seriously disputed after the war; cf. Harris, op. cit;, pp. 305—7; also Gaston
Jèze and Henri Truchy, The War Finance of France (London, Milford, 1927),
pp. 297 if. The final settlement of the 1916 advances was not reached until
1926, and then only after difficult negotiation. For this settlement, cf. Emile
Moreau, 'Le Relèvement Financier et Monétaire de Ia France, 1926—28,' Revue
des Deux Mondes, March 15, 1937, pp. 299—319. This is the second in a series42 BREAKDOWN
scale in the use of Japanese and Russian gold to build up
dollar balances after 1915.
At the same time gold was concentrated within the United
Kingdom. The Bank of England was able to avoid losses of
gold to domestic circulation, and even add to its reserves from
that source, and in August 1915certainjoint stock banks
transferred about £20 million in gold from their own hold-
ings to the Bank.
From these multifarious sources, many of which were evi-
dence of Great Britain's unique position in the world's bank-
ing system, a large but unknown 15 amount of gold was ac-
cumulated in the hands of the Bank and of the British gov-
ernment.
GOLD CONCENTRATION IN FRANCE
Like England, though in less degree, France was able early
in the war to draw gold from abroad. For further accumula-
tion of reserves, however, the only great resource open to
France was the domestic circulation. Very strenuous efforts
were made to get gold into the Bank of France. Large enter-
prises, such as the Chemin de Fer du Nord, were forced to
give up their gold reserves. The patriotism of the people
was appealed to systematically in an effort to counteract the
very active gold hoarding that continued throughout the war.
Gold in the French stocking was replaced to some degree by
notes. Comités d'Or were formed throughout the country,
and, by the end of 1917, 2,277 million francs in gold had been
taken from commerce and hoarding. During one period of
six weeks 300 million gold francs were obtained in this way.'°
of four articles by M. Moreau which appeared in the March i, March 15,
April i,and April 15, 1937 numbers of the Revue.
15 Figures of gold movements were not published afterigi6. Substantial
amounts imported into England and bought by the government did not appear
in any published account at the time; Messrs. Samuel Montagu & Co., Weekly
Review of the Foreign Exchanges, Aug.igt6.
Jeze and Truchy, op. cit., p. zoo; Blankàrt, op. cit., p. 67.PRESERVATION OF EXTERNAL FORMS 43
'GOLD CONCENTRATION IN THE UNITED STATES
During the latter part of the neutrality of the United
atthe inflationary possi-
bilities of the gold coming to her shores. This anxiety found,
however, no stronger expression than intimations to the En-
tente powers that if the large flow of gold to America con-
tinued, some definite steps to check it would be necessary.
Before an actual gold repulsion program was formulated,
however, the United States became a belligerent, and her
attitude on this point changed completely. To prevent an
outward flow of gold to the countries that still remained
neutral, the gold export embargo was imposed, and the gold
imports that continued to come in were regarded as a we!-
come addition to reserves. In addition, a vigorous policy of
gold concentration within the country was pursued. This
took the form of impounding gold in the Federal Reserve
•banks by the following means:
i)theencouragement of state banks to become members of the
Federal Reserve system in order to get gold from them in pay-
:rnent of Federal Reserve bank stock and for the establishment of
reserve balances
thepassage from a system in which part of the legal reserves
of member banks could be held in gold in their vaults to one in
'which only deposits with the Federal Reserve banks could count
as reserves
'3)an appeal to holders of gold certificates to exchange them for
Federal Reserve notes in order to increase the reserve ratio of the
Federal Reserve banks.
GOLD CONCENTRATION IN GERMANY AND OTHER CONTINENTAL
BELLIGERENTS
Germany every effort was made to accumulate gold and
concentrate it in the hands of the Reichsbank. The measures
taken were often extreme. Gold accumulated before 1913
i.n Spandau amounting to i 20 million marks, and another 12044 BREAKDOWN
million marks accumulated in 1913 and the first half of 1914,
were transferred to the Reichsbank.'7 During the war every
conceivable method of propaganda was adopted to get gold
from the people.'8 Lotteries were even arranged in which
winning tickets were given to those bringing gold to the
banks. The people were called upon to give up their gold
ornaments. In July 1918 a 'gold buying week' was instituted.
For Germany, moreover, the domestic circulation was not
the only means of building up central gold reserves. Gold
was taken from the occupied districts of Belgium, Roumania,
and Russia. Gold estimated at 400 million marks was ac-
quired by the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. Also almost all the
gold reserve of the Austro-Hungarian Bank was transferred
to the Reichsbank in 1915 to cover foreign payments.
Like France and Germany, Italy and Russia (until the
debacle of 1917) both engaged in the world-wide hunt for
gold. In March 1917,forexample, Italy offered a loan in pay-
ment for which Italian gold lire were accepted at a premium
ofper cent, sovereigns at the rate of 32.70 per lira, and
gold dollars at 6.70 per lira. The subscribers were given the
right to recover their gold six months after peace was declared
in exchange for Italian notes at par. This was a curious pro-
ceeding in a country in which the appearance of a gold pre-
mium was prohibited by law. The Russian Treasury used a
different device, giving foreign exchange to importers at par
less a 2 per cent commission against delivery of gold.'9
All the continental belligerents, in their efforts to concen-
trate gold, were faced by a steady contraband trade and do-
mestic hoarding. They all tried to exchange state obligations
for gold rather than for notes. The drafts they made upon
the domestic gold circulation in order to support their ex-
GastonJeze, 'Les Finances de Guerre de la France,' Revue de Science et de
Legislation Financieres, Vol. '3, 1915,p.6i8.
18Thesame policy of gold concentration wascarriedout by Germany's allies.
In Turkey the death penalty was imposed for making payments in gold.
19 detailsconcerning gold concentration by continental belligerents are
taken from Blankart, cit., pp. 64—9.PRESERVATION OF EXTERNAL FORMS 45
changes and keep the gold supplies of the central banks from
falling constituted a concerted passage from the forms of the
so-called 'full' or orthodox gold standard to those of the gold
bullion standard. The sacrifice of the gold circulation, like
that of free export and the right of convertibility, was part
of an effort to preserve, rather than destroy, the external
forms of the international gold standard by protecting bank
reserves and supporting exchange rates.
Gold Payment
Upon these large accumulations of gold liberal drafts were
made to support the exchanges. The pledge of portions of
the French, Russian, and Italian reserves to England in ex-
change for credits and the use of the reserves of Austria-
Hungary by Germany were part of this process.2° England
drew freely upon her accumulated gold stocks to support the
sterling exchange in New York and in other neutral markets,
and on several occasions in 1915and1916 even permitted the
reserve of the Bank of England to be drawn down. Substantial
amounts of gold were shipped from France to the United
States in 1915andigi6 and the theory was popularly dis-
cussed in France, especially in the form known as the Moroni
scheme, that the exchange might be supported by choking
America with gold and thereby raising American prices.
Large payments to neutrals were made in gold by Germany
on her own behalf and on behalf of Austria-Hungary directly
for goods and to support the exchanges.
This use of the accumulated gold reserves of the belligerent
powers constituted in effect the use of gold as a substantial
merchandise item in the balance of payments—a direct means
20Duringthe war France shipped 1.955 million francs in gold to England for
which credits of roughly three times this amount were secured (Annual Re-
ports oftheBank of France; cf. Jêze and Truchy, cit., p. From 0€-
tober toJuly 1917Russiashipped 450millionroubles of gold to England
(Katzenellenbaum,cit., p. 6o) .Italy,beginning in July 1915, shipped in all
562,300.000lireof gold to England (C. E. McGuire, Italy's International Eco-
nomic Position (Macmillan, 1926), p. 371).46 BREAKDOWN
of settling foreign debts and acquiring the material resources
necessary for the prosecution of the war. It was possible only
because of the continued existence of part of the legal frame-
work of the international gold standard—the willingness of
central banks to fulfil their legal obligations to buy all gold
offered them at fixed prices.
Gold Arbitrage
Until the United States entered the war, gold arbitrage trans-
actions of the pre-war type were frequent in neutral markets.
They were influential in keeping the dollar exchange from
depreciating in terms of certain continental European neu-
tral markets and those of certain South American countries.
They caused a secondary redistribution of the gold flowing
from the belligerents to America and increased the amount
moving to these smaller neutral countries.
Gold Repulsion
The international distribution of gold through gold payment
and gold arbitrage during the war was a danger to the main-
tenance of gold in its traditional place in the monetary and
banking systems of both the gold losing and the gold receiv-
ing countries. Both England and France parted with gold re-
luctantly because the loss of gold reserves was felt to be a
threat to the solvency of their banking systems. The same
conflict between the demand made upon available gold sup-
plies to build up reserves and that made to support the ex-
changes was present in Germany, where great importance
continued to be attached to the preservation of the gold re-
serves of the Reichsbank, and in other belligerent countries.
The circumstances that gave rise to alarm in belligerent coun-
tries lest gold reserves prove inadequate gave rise also to anxi-
ety in neutral countries lest the inward flowgold should re-
suit in excessive reserves and lead to rapid inflation. The
various impediments to the inward flow of gold established
by Sweden, Spain, the Netherlands, and Argentina, alreadyOF EXTERNAL FORMS 47
described,were part of a definite gold repulsion policy by
creditor countries. This was as truly an abandonment of parts
of the formal legal requirements of the international gold
standard in order to preserve as nearly as possible the system
of monetary and banking regulations long sanctioned by tra.
dition as was the suspension of specie payments and the im-
position of export embargoes by the belligerent powers.
The Subordinate Role of Gold
When applied to the pre-war period, our distinction between
the form and the substance of the international gold standard
would emphasize the role of gold as an instrument used to
secure certain economic and financial objectives by a world-
wide system of international credit having its principal center
in London. During the war the role of gold was even more
subordinate to that of credit. Gold movements were con-
trolled by the conscious, purposeful, and political direction
of central banks and treasuries which supplanted in large de-
gree the banking forces that had directed gold distribution
in time of peace. This is strikingly apparent, when the proc-
esses of gold concentration, gold payment, gold arbitrage,
and gold repulsion are examined in their relation to the
whole' effort of the world's credit and banking system to
maintain the gold standard as a traditional system of rates
anda domestic institution during the war.CHAPTER 3
The International Gold Standard as a Traditional
System of Rates during the War
One of the striking facts of the history of exchange rates dur-
ing the war is that they diverged widely from a familiar sys-
tem of gold pars which still remained in existence in law.
Yet it cannot be said that that system of gold pars did not
exert a profound influence upon the course of the exchanges.
It persisted throughout as the common conception of 'nor-
mal,' and any deviation from it was regarded as a deprecia-
tion or appreciation in terms of gold. Every country made
extraordinary efforts to keep the deviation of their exchanges
from the old system of parities as small as possible. These
efforts included unprecedented control of merchandise im-
ports by government, the restriction and control of capital
exports, the use of private and governmental international
credits, and a wholesale mobilization and alienation of for-
eign securities; also a whole series of measures to distribute
the available supply of foreign exchange and to prevent spec-
ulation by means of one form of exchange control or another,
and measures to fill by official dealings the gaps left by the
war in the mechanism of exchange arbitrage; finally, con-
trolled and directed distribution of gold. As a result, a solid
nucleus of relatively stable exchange rates was maintained
throughout the war, from which there was occasionally a
fanlike dispersion of certain other rates. At the time of the
Armistice there was a remarkable gravitation of the whole
system of rates toward the old pars.
Chart iindicates the composition of this central nucleus












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































around it. A single chart showing a large number of rates
would be difficult to read because of the crossing of many
lines and because, to include extreme quotations, the scale
would have to be so small that the fluctuations within the
central nucleus would be hard to distinguish. A tabular pres-
entation would not bring out sharply the relationships here
emphasized. Therefore a few important rates on New York
have been given for selected months and the grouping and
dispersion is indicated by showing the position of each rate
on a common scale of percentage deviations from pre-war
parity. In spite of the emphasis in these studies on the central
position of London in international finance it has seemed
wise to take New York as a base because of the terms in which
the foreign exchange problem was universally discussed from
1914to1925.Somebase must be chosen and both writer and
reader, and especially both chart maker and chart interpreter,
must not forget that by choosing a base every movement in
the system is shown as related to that base. The whole situa-
tion may be seen in quite a different light if the base is
shifted. The fanlike dispersion of rates around a central nu-
cleus during the war is an important fact, but it does not
appear if one glances at Dr. Blankart's admirable chart of
the behavior of exchange rates on Switzerland during the
war. There, with a few exceptions, one sees only various de-
grees off 'depreciation.'
The Key Rate in the System
The Dispersion of Rates, December 1914
ByDecember 1914 the foreign exchange deadlock was sub-
stantially broken. Sterling was at par in New York, and the
exchanges of France, the United States, Spain, Italy, the
Netherlands, Switzerland, and Great Britain, as a group, did
not deviate from their respective parities by more than 4
per cent whether Paris, New York, London, or Zurich is
taken as a base.1
1Theserelationships are clearly shown by the charts at the close of Dr. Blank.
art's book, and in Bullock, Williams, and Tucker, op. cit., p. 243.PRESERVATION OF EXTERNAL FORMS 51
The record is very incomplete, however, because of the
absence of published quotations for the yen,2 the Argentine
peso, and the milreis. Among the recorded rates the impor-
tant breaks in the pre-war system were the depreciation of
the currencies of Germany, Austria-Hungary, Russia, Den-
mark, and Chile.
Sources of Instability
A great strain was being put upon this system of rates. Even
lfl1915 theworld's currents of trade were becoming more
and more dominated by the movement of goods from neutrals
to belligerents—especially to the Entente powers. A glance
at the figures of war-time merchandise trade (Table 2) will
recall this extraordinary revolution in the direction of world
trade. The large increase in imports relative to exports in
the United Kingdom, France, Russia, and Italy, and the large
increase in exports relative to imports in the United States,
Argentina, Japan, Brazil, and Spain are striking features of
this table. The German and Austro-Hungarian trade figures
show the same sort of increase in the passive merchandise
balance as do those of the other belligerents, until the British
blockade became effective and America entered the war. The
influence of these events can be seen clearly in the German
figures which, in the absence of any official data, are taken
Taking New York as the base, the French franc, the peseta, and the pound
sterling were at about parity with the dollar. The lira was depreciated about
or 4 per cent; the mark 8 per cent; the Swedish krona 15percent; and the
roublepercent.
Taking Zurich as the base, the lira, the dollar, the French franc, the guilder.
tile pound sterling, and the peseta were within about 3 per cent of par. The
itarkwas depreciated about 8 per cent, and the rouble and the Austro-Hun
garian krone about 15percent.
Taking Paris as a base, the pound sterling, the guilder, the dollar, the Swiss
franc, the peseta, and the lira were at par or not depreciated more than about
3 per cent. The Swedish krona was depreciated about 8 per cent and the
rouble about i8 per cent.
Taking London as the base, the French franc, the dollar, the peseta, and
the guilder were at about par. The lira was depreciated aboutper cent, the
Swedish krona aboutper cent, and the rouble about to per cent.
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Ifrom a small volume by Dr. Kleine-Natrop published in
The trade of the northern European neutrals also was
German Merchandise Trade (milliards of paper marks)
IMPORTS EXPORTS EXCESSOFIMPORTS
i9i4, Aug.—Dec. 2.1 1.4 0.7
1915 7.1 3.' 4.1
1916 8.4 3.8 4.5
1917 7.1 3.5 3.6
1918 7.1 4.7 2.4
influenced profoundly by the blockade, and they too were
subject in the later years of the war to great pressure from
both sides to supply them with essential commodities. There
was even a regular trade between Germany and England
through the Netherlands known to both war offices. The lack
of definite trend, except in the case of Norway, may be partly,
if fbi: predominantly, due to these pressures, though the
matter has never been adequately studied. Some idea of their
severity may be gleaned from a passage in the Annual Report
of the Netherlands Bank for 1916—17 (English ed. p. 89)
"The Netherlands constantly had to supply many goods to for-
eign countries, more especially to the belligerent powers.
The Netherlands have supplied these goods, not only because they
would thereby earn money, but especially because such supply
had practically become a duty. On the one hand the country was
forced to find a market for its own agricultural products of which
the quantities produced considerably exceeded the home require-
against which the Netherlands could demand other goods,
particularly raw materials, fertilizer and cattle food from foreign
countries in order to keep its own industry and agriculture going.
On the other hand a certain pressure was placed on the country
by foreign powers which required our products for their own con-
sumption and who would have considered it as an unfriendly act
if we had stopped supplies; this imagined unfriendliness they
threatened to retaliate by impeding our free navigation across the
sea and by placing difficulties in the way of our import of grain,
Devi.cenpolitik in Deutschland var dem Kriege und in der Krieg's- und Nach-
kriegszeit(Berlin, Hans Preiss, 1922) .Aphotostatic copy of this work was
kindly sent to the author by the Institut fuer Weltwirtschaft at Kiel.54 BREAKDOWN
iron, coal, etc. In the end it therefore became a matter of life and
death for this country to maintain as much as possible the exports
of its own products."
The extraordinary war-imposed changes in the flow of
merchandise trade tended to
i) weaken the exchanges of all belligerents against neutral cur-
rencies and Japan: that is, to strengthen the American, Japanese,
and South American exchanges, and those of the smaller Euro-
pean neutrals against England, France, Italy, Russia, and Ger-
many and Austria-Hungary;
2)break up the British Empire exchanges by strengthening the
Indian rupee and Canadian dollar in sterling;
8)detach the French, Italian, and Russian exchanges from their
former relationships to sterling;
4)separate the German and Austro-Hungarian exchanges from
those of the Entente countries and of the neutrals.
That is to say, they threatened to disintegrate completely the
pre-war system of exchange rates and, indeed, to prevent the
establishment of any alternative system of rates.
Such a situation would have greatly increased the cost of
imports into the Entente countries and have seriously dis-
turbed their domestic price structures by causing erratic fluc-
tuations in the prices of imported goods. It would have intro-
duced an incalculable speculative element into all their inter-
national transactions and have increased the difficulties of
financing the war through foreign credit. Even more impor-
tant, it would have had the grave psychological disadvantage
of undermining the confidence of peoples in the strength and
in the future of their own currencies.
The Central Importance of the Sterling-Dollar Exchange
The sterling-dollar rate was the key rate in the effort to re.
sist these forces of disintegration. In the battle to preserve a
system of exchange rates Great Britain stood in a central
place, first, because as head of the Empire she was the repre-
sentative of a large group of countries maintaining stablePRESERVATION OF EXTERNAL FORMS 55
exchanges among themselves; second, because as financier
and supplier of her continental allies the sterling rate was of
immense direct importance to France, Italy, and Russia;
finally, because London continued to be during the war, as
;it had always been, the market for dollars for all Europe. As
long as the dollar-sterling rate remained relatively stable, and
the British Empire constituted a unit in currency matters, a
nucleus was established sufficiently broad to serve as the basis
Ifor other stabilization operations. There was a link between
i:he Empire, the Continent, and the Americas. The French
franccouldbe supported against the world, and the Canadian
dollar did not have to choose whether to follow the American
dollar or the pound.
The pound sterling itself, however, was subject to pressure
from a multitude of causes. Not only British, but French,
][talian, and Russian purchases of war materials in America
tended to weaken sterling in New York, as did large British
purchases of goods in America for resale to the continent.
The requirements of the continental allies for dollars could
be prcvided only in small part by direct remittance, for the
relatively small supply of dollars offered in the continental
markets was soon exhausted, and indirect remittance through
London tended to be the cheaper method of payment to
America. Under more normal conditions arbitrage transac-
tions would have kept the cost of the two methods of re-
mnittan.ce the same, while marginal adjustments in the more
flexible items in the balances of payments of the continental
countries would have relieved the pressure on sterling. Be-
fore the war the use of London as a clearing house for conti-
riental transactions with America did not mean that sterling
was urtder steady pressure in New York whenever continental
currencies were weak. But during the war there was a con-
stant tendency for the continental exchanges to be weaker
in New York than in London. Arbitrage opportunities in-
volving the purchase of sterling tended to be infrequent and
to be closed before any new equilibrium in the system oF ex-56 BREAKDOWN
change rates could be established. Arbitrage opportunities
involving the sale of sterling tended to appear regularly. In
the language of the market, sterling tended to decline in
New York 'in sympathy with' the weakness of the continental
exchanges.
Under these circumstances efforts to support the Conti-
nental exchanges in London without supporting them in
New York sharply accentuated the pressure on the sterling-
dollar rate by placing impediments in the way of an appro-
priate adjustment of the whole system of exchange rates. If
the essential weakness of the continental exchanges could not
express itself in a decline of these exchanges both in London
and New York, it had to express itself in a decline of these
exchanges in New York and a decline of sterling in New
York.4 These influences on the sterling-dollar rate were mag-
nified many fold by the role of England as financier of the
war for her continental allies. When France and Italy made
purchases in America with borrowed sterling, the pound
rather than the franc was weakened. When England bought
goods for cash or short credit in America and sold them on
the continent on liberal terms the same result followed.
The problem, therefore, of preventing the depreciation of
the currencies of the Entente countries other than England
both in London and New York became inseparably linked
with the problem of preventing the depreciation of sterling
in New York.
Measures of Support
In 1915 England began a highly selective use of her accumu-
lated gold in support of her exchanges;$ioçj million in gold
Cf. Ch. 29, The Possible Modes of Behavior of any Foreign Exchange Tn-
angle.
5 Where devices other than gold shipments could be used they were; e.g., the
issue of British treasury bills in Amsterdam against gold in London to pro-
vide the means of payment for goods bought in the Dutch East Indies (Harris,
op. cit., p. 303); and the whole poUcy adopted with reference to the Indian
rupee which reduced gold imports into india far below the pre-war average
(Brown, op. cit., pp. 30 if.).PRESERVATION OF EXTERNAL FORMS 57
was shipped directly from England to the United States, and
twice that amount ($219million)was shipped from Canada,
mostly from the English depositary in Ottawa. These Ca-
nadian shipments were the beginning of a new and increas-
ingly important phase in the history of that depositary. Sir
Thomas White has described these operations in the article
already quoted in connection with the 1914crisis:
"At the time that Great Britain was commandeering the Ameri-
can investments of British subjects, she was requisitioning gold
in all parts of the world for the same purpose, making payment
for the purchases of herself and her Allies in the United States.
This gold came principally from Great Britain, South Africa and
Russia, although small consignments were made from Brazil and
Borneo. It consisted of a miscellaneous assortment of British
sovereigns, American, Russian, German, Austrian, Japanese and
French coin, together with fine gold bars....Ofa total of
$1,200,000,000handledby the Department of Finance from the be-
ginning, $546,000,000 was for the account of the Bank of England,
and $658,000,000 for the account of the Imperial government.
From the United States $104,000,000wasreceived on the first
movement: on the reverse movement $491,000,000cameto hand
from Great Britain, $353,000,000fromSouth Africa, $253,000,000
fromRussia, $692,000 from Borneo and $172,000fromBrazil.
More than three quarters of the entire amount was represented by
bullion.
It will be of interest to know that $253,000,000wasreceived for
the Imperial Russian government. The gold was shipped from
Petrograd and Moscow to Viadivostock, there to Vancouver or
Esquitnalt via Japan in Japanese war ships.... Inall four con-
signments of this gold were received from February 1916 to May
1917...
Smallershipments of gold were made for similar purposes
from London to the Netherlands and Argentina. In addition
the Bank of France, after exhausting the supplies of foreign
exchange acquired in the second half of 1914,amounting,
according to Professor Jeze, to 400millionfrancs, began in
August 1915toexport gold to England, America, and Spain.58 BREAKDOWN
These exports amounted to i6o million francs, but this
method of supporting the exchange directly was soon aban-
doned for the policy already referred to of lending gold to
the Bank of England in exchange for British credits to the
French Treasury. The proceeds of these credits were in large
part made available to the French in the form of dollars, but
the debt was a sterling debt, a point vigorously insisted on by
M. Moreau in the negotiations of 1926. The French authori-
ties never deviated from their contention that it was an essen-
tial condition of these loans that on repayment of the credits
the gold should be returned to th.e Bank of France.°
It soon became evident, however, that gold shipments
alone could not meet the situation: they interfered with the
effort to maintain domestic gold reserves; they caused un-
easiness to the receivers and were inadequate in amount.
From the outset they were supplemented by credit. The Brit-
ish Dominions received advances sufficient to enable them to
maintain their London balances in the early months of the
war. The French government placed about 400 million francs
in treasury bills abroad in December andearly en-
couraged French bankers to borrow collectively in America.
In November 1914a$20 million revolving acceptance credit
was arranged for French account by Brown Brothers and
Company, which opened the doors of Federal Reserve credit
to the war needs of the Allies. In April 1915a$50million
issue of French 5 per cent bonds was offered in the American
market by a Morgan syndicate, and at the same time the Rus-
sian exchange was supported by French and British credits
and by the sale of treasury bills in London.
Jeze and Truchy, op. cit., pp. 298—9; Moreau, bc. cit.
7 E. L. Dulles, The French Franc, 1914—1918 (Macmillan, 1929),p. Miss
Dulles quotes the authority of Decamps for this statement. Jeze and Truchy
refer to a £2millionissue of French treasury bills placed in London by Messrs.
Rothschild in October 1914 and a £'Omillionissue placed by the Bank of
England in January 1915,aswell as to an issue of $io million treasury bills
placed in New York in November 1914.Op.cit., pp. 307,PRESERVATION OF EXTERNAL FORMS 59
The Formation of the Sterling-Dollar-Franc Nucleus
The 1)ispersion of Rates, August 1915
Inspite of the mounting difficulties that had called forth
these measures of support, there was still, in August 1915,a
certain cohesion in the whole structure of exchange rates.
The exchanges of Switzerland, Spain, Sweden, the Nether-
lands, Great Britain, Argentina, India, Canada, Japan, and
Denmark on New York stood at some time during that month
within 4 per cent of their pre-war parities. Those of the conti-
nental, belligerents, however, had moved with reference to
this group as a whole. The French franc had depreciated 8
per cent and the lira i6 per cent in New York. The mark had
depreciated ii percent in Zurich and 15percent in New
York; the Austrian krone 20 per cent in New York, and
the roubleper cent in Zurich, 22 per cent in Paris, and 25
per cent in New York.
Pegging and Exchange Control
These relationships were not stable. In spite of all measures
of support the disintegrating forces were getting the better of
the effort to preserve a system of relatively stable exchange
:rates in the latter part of 1915.Thetendency of the neutral
exchanges, especially those of the Netherlands, Sweden,
Spain, and Argentina, to rise, and of the Italian, Austrian,
German, and Russian exchanges to fall in terms of sterling
and dollars was very strong. The presence of strain within
the Empire group itself is abundantly evidenced by the diffi-
culties experienced in preventing the rupee from rising in
London. Finally, the difficulties of preserving a constant re-
1.ationship between the pound and the franc and the dollar
were becoming very great. Gold shipments to the United
States were continued on a large scale and, as was true
throughout the war, the exchanges continued to be supported
through the accumulation of balances in London, Paris, and6o BREAKDOWN
Italy by private shippers who wished to postpone remittances
home until a more favorable exchange situation prevailed.
A $500 million Anglo-French loan was negotiated in August,
signed in September, and subscribed in October 1915,but
this large amount, though less than the Allied negotiators
wished, was too large for the American market. The loan
was not very successful, and large portions of it remained in
the hands of the underwriters. Very large public loans in
America were thus shown not to be feasible, and the Anglo-
French loan was followed by a program of regular borrowing
in New York as dollars were required. In this program the
placing of short term treasury bills was the chief instrument.
Private credits continued to be arranged, such as those opened
for British banks in New York in November 1915,andthe
exchanges received support through substantial subscriptions
by Americans to the war loans of belligerents, particularly
to the French war loans of December 1915.
These various devices for strengthening the exchanges
were supplemented by the systematic mobilization of foreign
securities and by their sale or pledge in America. In this,
England took the lead. By various gradual approaches the
British Treasury moved from the encouragement of the pri-
vate sale or loan of foreign securities to the government to
the forcible taking over of such securities. The program was
initiated in July 1915,andby December the government had
purchased £46 million of such securities. In January 1916
the American Dollar Securities Committee was formed to
carry on this mobilization of securities, the sale of which be-
came the backbone of the support of the sterling-dollar ex-
change until April 1917 and one of the major factors in trans-
forming the United States into a creditor country.8 Canada
The Committee reported on December1919 thatthe total securities pur-
chased, including Canadian and South American issues, amounted to £216
million,while £406 million were lent to the Treasury. Of these amounts £178
million and £73 million respectively were American securities. German owned
securities in England were made subject to this mobilization.PRESERVATION OF EXTERNAL FORMS 6i
made a special contribution to the support of sterling by lend-
ing securities to the British government which were suitable
for pledging in New York, and also relieved the sterling ex-
change by placing refunding issues of Canadian municipali-
ties in New York rather than London. Other currencies were
supported by similar means. The French government did not
resort to compulsion, but published lists of securities it would
borrow or buy, reserving the right to extend the loans or, in
case of need, to sell the securities, and by the middle of 1916
it had received 1,200 million francs in such securities. The
Gernian government did not approach the people directly
by a popular press campaign, but at first requested the banks
to induce their clients to sell securities or pledge them abroad
with the idea of recalling them after the peace. That is to
say, the banks were to urge their clients to embark upon a
long run foreign exchange speculation. The motive appealed
to illustrates the importance of the concept of normal ex-
change rates during the war, for only if the exchange rates
returned to 'normal' after the war could the transaction prove
profitable. The practical results of this suggestion in provid-
ing Germany with foreign exchange during the war were
not great, for foreign securities when sold abroad by Germans
were for the most part exchanged for liquid balances abroad
and not used for the purchase of marks with pounds, francs,
or dollars. Not until March 1917didGermany resort to the
forcible taking over of foreign securities and even then em-
phasized the loan aspect of the transaction by undertaking
to replace the commandeered securities three years after
peace was made with England.
The resources assembled in this way were used by the bel-
ligerents in a systematic effort to control the exchanges. Con-
trol of the sterling-dollar rate began in August 1915and in
January 1916 the dollar rate in London was definitely pegged
at 4.767/b. The actual method of stabilization was the pur-
°
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chase and sale of British treasury bills in New York and the
use of the proceeds to buy sterling.'0 In addition a fund of
$50 million was made available in London by New York
bankers to help control daily fluctuations." The Bank of
France began to extend its influence in the foreign exchange
markets in the summer of 1915byundertaking to sell ex-
change to those who could prove their genuine commercial
interest at a cheaper price than the market. In August 1915
an exchange control mechanism was set up, but even so it
was impossible to prevent the appearance of a 'cours hors
cote' lower than the official rate of the Bank.12 The general de-
cline of the franc in New York was, however, halted and on
April 14, 1916 the British and French governments agreed to
stabilize the franc. It was under this arrangement that Bank
of England credits were obtained against gold, neutral securi-
ties, and French treasury bills. In this way a nucleus of rela-
tively stable exchange rates—the sterling-dollar-franc nucleus
—was definitely established and endured throughout the rest
of the war.
Great efforts were put forth in Germany and Austria-
Hungary to keep the exchanges of the Central Powers rela-
lively stable with reference to this nucleus. In Germany ex-
change control was introduced in the form of Devisencen-
tralen which, like other agencies of exchange control, under-
took to distribute the available supply of exchange and to
permit no exchange transactions the purpose of which was
not known to the authorities and regarded as necessary. This
control first took legal form on January 28, 1916 when the
Reichsbank and twenty-six elected banking firms of Berlin,
Frankfurt, and Hamburg were formed into a foreign cx-
lOJ. P. Morgan & Co., as British fiscal agents in New York, purchased from
1915 to 1919 approximately £840 million of sterling exchange. E. M. Fried-
man, International Finance and its Reorganization (Dutton, 1922), p. 377.
"Jaeger, op. cit., pp. 21—2.
'2Through its own resources and through credits secured in London and New
York the Bank of France purchased i8 milliard francs of French exchange
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change monopoly with headquarters in Berlin. The repre-
sentatives of these firms, together with the sworn brokers and
in the presence of the Staatskommissar, met in their respec-
tive cities and, after telephone communication with the other
centers, fixed the buying and selling rates on the Nether-
lands, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Switzerland, Austria-Hun-
gary, Bulgaria, and the United States. The Devisencentralen
carried out the foreign exchange and security arbitrage busi-
ness of the country at these rates, and their authority was
early extended to include also supervision of the underlying
transactions. All incoming exchange had to be turned over
to the Consortium, which became the sole seller of drafts on
Foreign countries. In Austria-Hungary a somewhat different
form of Devisencentral organization was set up consisting of
two central offices, one in Vienna and one in Budapest. Oper-
ating at first on the basis of voluntary cooperation by banks
it was a failure, and even when all dealings in foreign ex-
changes outside these offices were forbidden in the early part
of 19L7,itproved ineffective.13
Stability of the World's Exchanges, January 1916 to Novem-
ber 1916
As a consequence of all these measures the structure of the
world's exchange rate system was on the whole remarkably
stable during 1916. The American, British, French, Italian,
and Russian exchanges on Zurich were in November 1916
within 2 per cent of what they had been in January igi6, the
German exchange was within 4 per cent, the Dutch and
Spanish within 7 per cent, and the Austrian within 10 per
cent.
The United States, Swedish, British, Italian, and Russian
exchanges on Paris were in November 1916 within 2 per cent
of what they had been in January 1916, the Swiss exchange
was within 5 per cent, the Dutch within i i per cent.
L8Exceptwhere otherwise noted, the details of the support and control of the
exchanges in continental countries given inthis section are taken from
Blankart, op. cit., pp. 75—139.
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The Swedish, United States, French, Italian, and Russian
exchanges on London were in November igi6 within 3 per
cent of what they had been in January 1916, and the Spanish
and Dutch exchanges within 8 per cent.
The Swedish, British, French, German, Italian, and Rus-
sian exchanges on New York were in November igi6 within
2 per cent of what they had been in January 1916, the Argen-
tine exchange was within 5 per cent, and the Spanish within
io per cent.
These relationships appear from an examination of average
monthly rates and also from Chart 1, which indicates that
the Japanese, Canadian, Indian, Brazilian, and Austrian ex-
changes in New York shared in the general stability of rates.
The area of relative exchange stability included the ex-
changes of many countries which had a strong tendency to
rise in London. Since the dollar was pegged to sterling, it
also, through the influence of arbitrage, experienced weak-
ness in these exchanges. Opportunities arose for the purchase
of sterling exchange with Argentine pesos, pesetas, and other
neutral currencies, and with the Japanese yen, the sale of this
sterling for dollars and the purchase of gold with these dol-
lars. As a consequence, these exchanges were prevented from
rising as much as they would otherwise have done against
sterling, and a substantial portion of the gold sent to New
York to stabilize sterling and the franc was passed on to these
neutral countries. Therefore, the pegging at the center, in
conjunction with the continued observance of the require-
ments of the international gold standard by the United States
during the major part of her neutrality, bound the outlying
currencies to the central nucleus.
The Exhaustion of European Resources available for the Sup-
port of the Exchanges
From the opening of the war to April i, 1917 the Allies pur-
chased $7 billion of goods from the United States. In pay-
ment $i,6oo million of visible and normal invisible itemsPRESERVATION OF EXTERNAL FORMS 65
were imported, together with $i,ioo million in gold. The
liquidation of $500 million of American short term debt
abroad, the sale of $1,400 million of American securities and
other assets, collateral loans of $1,400 million, and unsecured
loans of approximately $i billion provided the balance.14 By
autumn igi6 the resources available for exchange pegging
began to be exhausted. The beginnings of a disintegration
of the system of rates maintained at such great cost from
January to November 1916 were already apparent in the
actua]. quotations. The exchanges of the Central Powers were
breaking away from the sterling-dollar-franc nucleus and the
anxieties of the British Treasury reached a peak eloquently
described by J. M. Keynes in his Economic Consequences of
the Peace (p. 273) in these words:
"The financial history of the six months from the end of the sum-
mer of igi6 up to the entry of the United States into the war in
April., 1917 remains to be written. Very few persons outside the
half dozen officials of the British Treasury who lived in daily
contact with the immense anxieties and impossible financial re-
quirements of those days can fully realize what steadfastness and
courage were needed and how entirely hopeless the task would
soon have become without the assistance of the United States
Treasury."
The Fanlike Spread of the Exchanges around the Nucleus
after America's Entry into the War
Preservation of the Nucleus
With the entry of the United States into the war, the whole
aspect of foreign exchange pegging was altered by the substi-
tution of advances from the United States Treasury for the
nearly exhausted resources of the British and the French. The
nucleus of stable exchange rates between Paris, London, and
New York was maintained fundamentally through these
14 Statement of J. P. Morgan & Co., New York Ti,nes, January7, 1936, p. 8.
The principal collateral loans were loans of $8oo million to England secured by
$i. billion of collateral, and loans to France of $2oo million secured by $240
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American credits, and the Paris rate was gradually brought
into a closer approximation to the pre-war pars.
The Fanlike Spread of the Exchanges and the Measures taken
to Modify It
The preservation of the central nucleus was not, however,
achieved without some sacrifice in general exchange stability.
The German and Austrian exchanges continued to move
downward with reference to it and constituted more than ever
a separate system because this great of American
credit was not available to support them. Moreover, the tend-
ency of the other heutral exchanges to rise against sterling
and the dollar was now accentuated by very heavy purchases
in certain neutral countries by the United States for war
needs. The shipment of gold to the United States, which had
been so great during 1915and1916 and the first half of 1917,
wasshut off, while the forces making for the movement of
gold out of the United States to neutral countries not only
continued in operation but were greatly strengthened. Like
other belligerents, the United States embarked, with her
entry into the war, upon a vigorous policy of gold concentra-
tion. The drain of gold to neutrals became an impediment to
the execution of this policy and caused the gold export em-
bargo of September 1917.Thisembargo removed the check
that had kept the exchanges of the neutrals from rising in
London and New York. During 1917alsothe military re-
verses of Italy and the general disintegration of Russia as an
Allied power caused a rapid depreciation of the lira and the
rouble in terms of dollars, francs, and pounds.
Exchange rates therefore spread like a fan around the
central group, the northern European, South American, and
Japanese exchanges tending to rise above; the Italian, Rus-
sian, and the German and Austrian group falling below.
In order to counteract the tendency of the neutral ex-
changes to split off from the nucleus, many credit arrange-
ments were entered into, and the extraordinary spectacle wasPRESERVATION OF EXTERNAL FORMS 67
presented of the great powers of the world demanding credits
from many small countries. France borrowed from Spain,
Uruguay, Switzerland, Argentina, the Netherlands, Norway,
Sweden, and Japan as well as from the United States and
Great Britain.England borrowed from Argentina,the
Netherlands, and Japan as well as from the United States.
The United States borrowed from Spain, India, Argentina,
and Bolivia. Russia borrowed from Italy, France, and Japan
as well as from Great Britain and the United States. The
extraordinary amount and variety of these loans is shown





Advances of U.S.A. abroad until April 7, 1917 13,866
Advances of U.S. Treasury to December 1918 42,087
Advances of British Treasury to its Allies to end of July 1918 37,748
Advances of the Banque de France to the Allies to October 2, 19183,490
Direct Advances of the French government to its Allies to end of 19173,207
Italian Advances to Russia 250
Advances of Japan to its Allies to January 1918 2,781
Advances of Argentina to U.S.A. to May igz8 1,030
Advances of Argentina to France to September 1918 472
Advances of Germany to Austria-Hungary to December 5, 19174,608
Advances of Germany and Austria to Italy to end of 1917 4,700
Advances of Germany to Bulgaria to end of 1917 1,350
Advances of Roumania to Austria in September igi8 155
Advances of Neutrals to France to September igi8 570
to Great Britain 6oo
to Germany (estimated) 8oo
117,714
In addition, very large open book credits were extended
by neutrals to the belligerents. These credits were often un-
willingly granted. In some countries, the Netherlands for
example, they were a consequence of the accumulation of
balances in the belligerent countries which could be brought
home by individual holders only if funded by domestic credit
institutions. Often the borrowers did not hesitate to use
compulsion in extorting credits as a price for continuing to
purchase in neutral markets. The belligerents threatened to
inter:Eere with the necessary imports of neutrals unless they
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stabilization loans. Such loans were ostensibly arranged upon
the basis of the common interest of the parties in a return to
normal exchange rates after the war. A series of Swiss and
Dutch loans to Germany, Spanish loans to France and the
United States, and Dutch loans to Austria were examples of
such pressure. Roumanian loans to Austria were an extreme
case. They represented in effect a sort of war contribution.5
This system of public and private credit, of which
United States Treasury advances were the core and center,
was supplemented by a general tightening of exchange con-
trol devices. In France an Exchange Commission was set up
on July 6, 1917 in the Ministry of Finance and given over-
sight over the foreign exchange markets and over the arrange-
ment of credits to support the franc, and on April 2, 1918 a
decree prohibiting capital exports from France gave a mo-
nopoly of foreign exchange transactions to firms keeping a
foreign exchange register. Italy introduced a legal monopoly
of the foreign exchange business in 1917 and government ex-
change control in the spring of 1918.16 In many countries, es-
pecially Germany, Austria, and Italy, these devices were
gradually integrated with measures to control imports. Amer-
ican policy was in this respect quite different. In the United
States control of the exchanges was carried to an extreme
point in order to fulfil a fourfold policy:(1)to cut down
unnecessary sales of the Allied exchanges;(2)to cut down
unnecessary purchases of neutral exchanges; (3) to prevent
the enemy from securing aid through dealing in neutral ex-
changes; (4) to prevent the process of credit inflation in the
United States from meeting a check due to a drain of gold or
Blankart,cit., p. i6o. Dr. Blankart gives the following further instances.
In 1917Switzerlandhad to purchase from Germany the lifting of the pro.
hibition of the importation of silk, docks, and embroidery by giving a credit to
Germany of i8 million Swiss francs (ibid., pp. 152 if.).Frenchcredits were ex-
torted from Switzerland under threat of payment by the French of their ad-
verse trade balance in silver under the rules of the Latin Monetary Union.
During the later years of the war Germany insisted, as a condition of import-
ing certain goods fromSwitzerland, that the proceeds of the sale in marks
must remain in Germany until the end of the war (ibid., p. 177).
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leading to the formal abandonment of the gold standard.
Under the terms of regulations issued in January 1918 no
person could engage in a very comprehensive list of transac-
tions in the exchanges without obtaining a registration cer-
tificai:e or specific approval for each particular transaction
from the Federal Reserve Board. All holders of registration
certificates had to report to the Federal Reserve Board all ac-
Counts or securities carried with or for foreign correspond-
ents, and all changes in such accounts and all purchases, sales,
and other transactions in the foreign exchanges or securities
for or through foreign correspondents. All dealers had to ob-
tain from customers declarations showing the exact purpose
of each purchase or sale of foreign exchange. All dealers'
books were open to the inspection of the Federal Reserve
Board, which had power to prohibit or postpone the consum-
mation of any foreign exchange transaction. The Secretary
ofTreasury was given arbitrary powers to prohibit, either
through the Board or directly, any such transaction, and this
vast fund of information was used to control the shipment of
goods, especially to neutrals.17
In addition to measures of exchange control, arbitrage op-
erations were undertaken deliberately in order to reduce
fluctuations in the exchanges, which were naturally great dur-
ing a period when transactions were restricted and ordinary
speculative operations prevented. In Great Britain these op-
erations were conducted secretly in all markets through the
British foreign banking system and through agents. In France
they were conducted directly from Paris by the Bank of
France, which used the foreign branches of French banks as
its agents.
Exchange control was successful in preserving the sterling-
dollar-franc nucleus, but not in preventing a considerable ap-
preciation of the neutral exchanges over these central cur-
rencies. Nor could it prevent the steady depreciation of cer-
tamexchanges in terms of the nucleus, in particular those of
the Central Powers. The link between the sterling-dollar-
Beckhart, cit., IV, 234—49.70 BREAKDOWN
franc system and the system centered about the mark was
chiefly the mark-Swiss franc rate. Germany made very great
efforts to prevent the mark from falling in the Swiss markets,
but these definitely failed in January 1918. Thereafter the
two systems of exchange rates became quite distinct.
The Approach to 'Normal,' November 1918, and
the Idea of Par
During the concluding months of the war a stabilization of
the Italian lira, similar to that of the franc, was finally
achieved by an agreement between the British, French, and
Italian treasuries. The lira was stabilized at a discount of 17
per cent from the pre-war parity with the pound sterling. At
about the same time the control of the neutral exchanges in
New York began to be so complete that their high premiums
over the dollar, and consequently over sterling, began to dis-
appear. Furthermore the approaching end of the war induced
speculation based upon the hope that exchange rates would
soon return to normal. At the time of the Armistice, there-
fore, the exchange rates of the Netherlands, Spain, the United
States, Great Britain and the British Empire, Japan, France,
Sweden, Argentina, Brazil, and Italy differed remarkably
little, in view of all the circumstances, from those which pre-
vailed before the war. The approximation to the old system
of pars was so close that the general public and even informed
opinion in the belligerent countries retained unshaken a be-
lief in an early return to 'normal' rates as established by the
pre-war international gold standard system. If deviations
from parity with the pound sterling are taken as a measure,
it is a striking fact that at the close of hostilities the Dutch,
Spanish, and Swedish exchanges were less than io per cent
above parity, the American exchange 2 per cent above, the
French exchange 2 per cent below, and the Italian 17 per
cent below. If, however, the Swiss franc were taken as a point
from which to measure, one would have to say that all these
exchanges were depreciated from 2 to 25 per cent.CHAPTER 4
The International Gold Standard during the War
as a System of Pegged Exchanges
The eKtraordinary use offcreditduring the war to preserve
the external form of the international gold standard as a
traditional system of rates brought out in sharp relief certain
aspects of the relationship of foreign lending to international
(:learance, and greatly magnified the ordinary effects of for-
eign loans upon the banking systems of both lending and
borrowing countries.
Loans in Support of the Foreign Exchanges in Their
Relation to International Clearance
The history of international lending during the war is in
part the history of a conflict, already present before the war,
between two principles governing the attitude of lenders to-
ward the use by borrowers of the proceeds of foreign loans.
The fi:rst is the principle that the proceeds of foreign loans
should be used in the lending country to give employment to
domesi:ic capital and labor, as exemplified in the foreign loan
policies of France and Belgium. The second is the principle
cf allowing free use of the proceeds by the borrower and rely-
i:ng upon their return to the lending country through the
international clearings, as exemplified in British policy.
In a world in which international lenders are few the rigid
application of the first principle is a force that comes in con-
flict with the promotion of a world-wide distribution of goods
in international trade, the encouragement of increased pro-
duction in the borrowing country from which the loans must
ultimately be repaid, and, according to free trade doctrine,
7'72 BREAKDOWN
the improvement of the standard of living of countries eco•
nomically interdependent. Before the war it was not allowed
to prevail over the second principle. Granting free use of the
proceeds to the borrower by the lender was the dominant
characteristic of international lending under the interna-
tional gold standard of pre-war days because it was the prac-
tice of the dominant lender. It was British practice until the
eve of the war because it was consistent with the particular
interest of Great Britain as the country most dependent upon
the growth of international tradein general and best
equipped to be a world financial center.
Because this was the practice of the dominant lender, the
effects of foreign loans, as a time-bridging device filling gaps
in the balances of payments of many countries, were diffused
throughout the world, and lent general support to the whole
system of foreign exchange rates.
The Attitude of Governments toward the Use of the Proceeds
of Foreign Loans
The assumption by governments of the role of international
lenders on a vast scale during the war greatly strengthened
all the considerations leading to restrictions on the use of
the proceeds of foreign loans. Under war-time conditions,
especially in Great Britain, it was no longer safe to rely upon
the international clearings to bring home the proceeds of
foreign loans. To justify large extensions of credit to foreign
powers from public funds, all governments, particularly dem-
ocratic governments, must be able to point to clearly demon-
strable domestic advantages accruing from such advances. For
a government to put foreigners in possession of public funds
in order to enable them to purchase the goods of other for-
eigners and thus employ foreign capital and labor gives at no
time a domestic advantage clearly or easily demonstrable to
the electorate, even when these foreigners are allies or as-
sociates in a great war. If, at the same time, the result of such
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to support against the pressure of purchases abroad required
by a life and death struggle, it is natural for such a govern-
.ment to be reluctant to make advances of this kind or even
to permit them to be made by private lenders.
1t is not surprising therefore that the lending governments
usually tried to arrange for the proceeds to be spent within
their own borders. A Treasury Minute of November 17, 1914,
forexample, stated that only under exceptional circumstances
were British government credits to the Dominions to be used
outside the United Kingdom; and the British agreement
with France of April 30, 1915 provided that the French gov-
ernnient was to spend in Great Britain one-third of the cred-
its pul; at its disposal by the British government.
This principle was strongly entrenched in the mind of the
American government, which willingly granted credits to its
allies for purchases in America but frequently objected to
making such advances for the support of the foreign ex-
changes in general, for the reimbursement of credits pre-
viously granted by Great Britain to other allies, or for the
Ilnancing of purchases in Great Britain, the Empire, or neu-
tral countries.
Modifications of Policy forced by the Requirements of For-
eign Exchange Pegging
There were, however, many modifications of this attitude by
both Great Britain and the United States. Great Britain made
loans to France and other allies to finance the purchase of
goods in the United States and neutral countries. When
America entered the war it was agreed that the burden of
advances to allied countries to finance purchases of goods in
neutral countries should be divided between Great Britain
and the United States. A certain number of credits were ob-
tained. in the United States for the reimbursement of Great
Britain for credits extended to finance purchases in Great
Britain and the Empire,' though all these credits were in-
LThesedetails are taken from Harris,cit., pp.246—59.74 BREAKDOWN
consistent with the principle of restricting the use of the
proceeds to expenditures in the lending country. So also were
the large loans made by both Great Britain and the United
States to support the sterling-franc and sterling-dollar rates
without direct reference to the purchases of France in Great
Britain and of Great Britain in the United States. Table3
TABLE 3
Summary of Advances by the United States Treasury to
Foreign Governments and Expenditures reported by them
April 6, 1917—NOvember I,1920 (millionsof dollars)
GREAT
BRITAIN FRANCE' ITALY1
Advances by U.S. Yreasury
Net Cash Advanced 4,196 2,966 1,631
Expenditures Reported
Exchange and cotton purchases 1,682 8o6 88
Other commodities and services 4,444 1,595 6o6
Interest 388 269 58
Maturities 354 290
Silver 262 6
Miscellaneous 70 184 I i6
Reimbursements i 1,046 784
Total Reported Expenditures 7,219 4,196 1,652
Minus:
Reimbursements from U.S. credits to other
governments 1,854 19
Dollar payments by U.S. government for
foreign currencies 449 1,025 14
Proceeds of rupee credits and gold from India 8i
Total Deductions 2,384 1,044 14
Net Expenditures 4,835 3,151 1,638
Condensed from Exhibit 26, Annual Report of the Secretary of the Treasury,
1920
1 Many credits obtained by France and Italy and other borrowers in the United
States were for the purpose of reimbursing Great Britain for purchases made by
her in America on behalf of these borrowers. Such lending was consistent with
the principle of the expenditure of the proceeds of loans in the United States,
for it merely eliminated the middleman position of Great Britain by establishing
direct obligations between those who had really purchased the goods in the
United States and United States lenders. These loans were, however, unwelcome
to the United States government precisely because they substituted for a British
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indicates the extent of American deviation from this prin-
ciple.
These modifications in the declared policies of govern-
ments with respect to foreign loans were forced by the major
requirements of war finance. It was an imperative physical
requirement for waging war that war supplies should be
drawn from the entire world. As long as this requirement had
to be met it was impossible for the financiers of the war to
continue successfully to support the exchanges and at the
same time adhere to the principle that the proceeds of foreign
loans should be spent at home.
The Relation of Foreign Lending in War Time to Interna-
tional Clearance, A bstractly Considered
'The interconnections of all types of international lending
and their relation to the effort to preserve the international
gold standard as a traditional system of rates may be seen
from an abstract statement of the effects of certain major types
of British and American foreign loan upon the exchanges
during the war. The basic reason for these loans was to make
it possible for belligerents to purchase the means of waging
war without harmful repercussions on the exchanges. Two
assum;ptions are therefore made in this discussion: first, that
currently accumulating credits were insufficient to provide
payment for essential purchases of goods without forcing
down exchange rates; second, that the essential purchases
would have been made even at the cost of declining exchange
rates.
The cases chosen for illustration are all connected with the
provis:ton of British credits to France to enable her to make
purchases in England, in America, and in neutral countries.
Case 1: British Loans to Finance French Purchases of British
Goods in England. When Great Britain made loans to France
to enable her to buy goods in England the direct effect of the
credits upon the exchange market was that an increased offer76 BREAKDOWN
of francs was met by an increased supply of sterling. There
were no repercussions in other exchange markets, but that
fact was in itself of great importance to other countries. Had
the French purchases been made without the British credits
the attempt to pay for them would, under our general as-
sumptions, have weakened the French exchange on London
but would not have influenced the sterling-dollar or the franc-
dollar rates directly. Therefore between these three coun-
tries 2anopportunity for arbitrage profit would have been
opened through the sale of francs for dollars, dollars for
pounds, and pounds for francs.3 Arbitrage operations of this
type would have diffused the initial weakness of the franc, at
first concentrated in the sterling-franc rate, for they would
have set up a tendency for the franc to recover in London but
fall in New York, and for the pound to rise in New York.
The pound would have appeared to be generally strong,
but stronger against francs than against dollars, and the franc
generally weak, but weaker in pounds than in dollars. A new
triangular relationship would have been in process of forma-
tion, a result inconsistent with the policy of maintaining as
closely as possible the traditional system of rates of the gold
standard. Moreover the new system would not have been
stable unless, with the decline in the franc in the other mar-
kets, the French purchases in England had been compensated
for by some increase in French exports, some attraction of
foreign funds to France, a compensating contraction in other
French imports, or some similar movement of the French
balance of payments into a new equilibrium at the new ex-
change rates. By the hypothesis of an insistent war-time de-
mand for goods any contraction in imports is ruled out, and
the other adjustments made very improbable. Consequently
2Thesethree markets, of course, were in practice not the only markets in
which arbitrage adjustments were in progress, but these cases are outlined in
abstract form to provide the basis for a general argument, not as illustrations
of the exact practice of the markets during the war.
The initiative in taking advantage of this opportunity could, of course, have
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the franc's depreciation in London would probably have con-
tinued, but its power to pull down the dollar in sympathy
would probably not have been prolonged. For any tendency
of the dollar to decline in sterling would have had a stimulat-
ing effect upon American exports and a contracting effect
upon American imports since the peculiar inelasticity as-
sumed. with reference to the French powers of adjustment
did not apply to America in war time. Depreciation in ster-
:ling would indeed have strengthened tendencies already
strongly at work in the American balance of payments. These
reactions would have checked the decline of the dollar in
London and increased its strength in Paris, without influenc-
ing directly the sterling-franc rate. The effect would have
been that the arbitrage opportunities caused by the original
weakness of the franc in London would not have been
closeduntil the franc had depreciated equally in both
London and New York. The initial weakness of the franc
would now have become diffused in a different way, but this
would have been a result just as repugnant to the principle
of maintaining the traditional system of rates as the initial
effects of the French purchases in England had been. There-
fore unless that objective was abandoned it would have been
necessary, as soon as the franc began to fall in London, for
the French to obtain credits in America. They could then
have offered dollars for sterling and made payment for their
in England without excessive offers of francs in
the London market. The consequent strength of the franc
in London and of sterling in New York would then have re-
inforced the tendencies already at work in these two ex-
changes through arbitrage operations. Consequently the use
of these American credits would soon have closed the pre-
vious arbitrage opportunities and substituted exactly opposite
OfleS.It would have become profitable to sell dollars for
Strictly speaking, an arbitrage opportunity does not remain open for more
than a minutes, but it may continually be renewed ii the underlying forces
are continued. The term is used here in the latter sense.78 BREAKDOWN
francs, francs for pounds, and pounds tor dollars, and this
would have continued until the reestablishment of the former
equilibrium of rates had rendered further credits unneces-
sary.
To summarize: The extension of British credits to France
to finance the purchase of British goods left the task of peg-
ging the sterling-dollar and the dollar-franc rates exactly
what it had been before, but if these credits had not been ex-
tended, then (i)theFrench purchases would have had to be
foregone, an eventuality ruled out by hypothesis, or (2) the
system of fixed exchange rates between the three currencies
would have had to be abandoned and a new system estab-
lished under which the French could substantially increase
their exports, or acontinuously unstable system of ex-
change rates would have come into existence as a result of
persistent weaknessthe franc, or theold system of
rates would have been preserved by American credits, ex-
tended, as far as the use of the proceeds was concerned, in
direct contradiction to the expressed policy of the American
government.
CaseBritish Loans to France to finance French Purchases
in the United States. When Great Britain made loans to
France to enable her to buy goods in America, sterling was
placed in French hands and the first direct effect on the ex-
change markets was to weaken the pound in New York as
expenditures were made in the purchase of goods. These
transactions did not directly affect either the sterling-franc
or the franc-dollar rates. Therefore, between these three
countries an arbitrage profit presented itself, again through
the sale of francs for dollars, dollars for pounds, and pounds
for francs. Arbitrage operations of this type diffused the
initial weakness of the pound, at first concentrated in the
sterling-dollar rate, for they set up a tendency for the pound
to recover in New York but to fall in Paris, and for the dollar
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:lished on this basis; that is, the franc tended to be 'dragged
down by' or to decline 'in sympathy with' the pound. But the
establishment of a new relationship between the three rates
was not, in this case any more than in Case i, consistent with
the policy of maintaining as closely as possible the tradi-
i.ional system of rates of the gold standard. Therefore, in
order not to abandon that objective, both France and Eng-
had to obtain credits in America. As a result sterling
was strengthened in New York from three sources—from
i:he proceeds of their American credits offered by the French
to repay part of their sterling debt to England, from the in-
creased supply of dollars available to the English from their
American credits, and from the demand for sterling incident
1:0 arbitrage operations. The resulting rise of sterling did not
have to proceed far before it closed the previously existing
arbitrage opportunities, but it had to be carried far enough
1:0 open exactly opposite arbitrage opportunities before the
old system of rates could be reestablished by sales of dollars
francs, francs for pounds, and pounds for dollars.
Had French purchases in America been made without
British credits, the attempt to pay for them would have
weake:ned the franc in New York. This weakness of the franc
would have opened arbitrage opportunities to sell dollars
for francs, francs for sterling, and sterling for dollars, and
would have set up a tendency to establish a new system of
rates in the manner described above. Weakness in New York
would now have spread from the franc to the pound rather
than in the opposite direction, but the new relationships
would probably not have been stable, and the balance of
payments adjustments would, in the manner described under
Case i, probably have produced in the end an equal and per-
sistent weakness of the franc in both sterling and dollars. To
prevent this, American credits would have had to be extended
to France to cover French purchases in America.
To summarize: The consequences of British loans to
France to purchase goods in the United States were to in-8o BREAKDOWN
crease the pressure for American loans to England by making
the task of pegging the dollar-sterling rate more difficult,
and to increase the pressure for American loans to France
through the reflection in the franc exchange of the weakness
of the pound. The increase in loans to England from
America on this account would have made her a principal in
a system of debts involving a British debt to America and a
French debt to England in which Great Britain was an inter-
mediary.
Had British credits not been forthcoming three possibili-
ties would have been present:
i)for French purchases in the United States not to have been
made at all—an eventuality ruled out by hypothesis;
2)forthe traditional system of exchange rates to be abandoned
as a consequence of attempts to pay for these French purchases;
3)for America to make loans to France in strict accordance with
the stated policy of the government.
CaseBritish Loans to France to finance French Purchases
in Neutral Countries. When Great Britain lent sterling to
France to enable her to buy goods in neutral countries the
first direct effect on the exchange market was to weaken the
pound in neutral markets through the offer of sterling in
those markets by the French. This transaction did not di-
rectly affect the franc-neutral exchange rates or the sterling-
franc rate. It therefore opened an arbitrage opportunity for
the sale of francs for neutral exchanges, of neutral exchanges
for pounds, and of pounds for francs. The initial weakness of
sterling, therefore, at first concentrated in the sterling-neutral
markets, tended to be diffused by these arbitrage operations,
for they set up a tendency for the pound to recover in neutral
markets, but to weaken in Paris, and for the franc to weaken
in neutral markets. in the manner described it set up a tend-
ency toward a new relationship between the pound, the franc,
and neutral exchanges, with the franc and the pound both
depreciated in neutral markets, though in unequal degree.
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relations to other currencies were not affected in any way
by the original transaction, to maintain stable exchange rates
in neutral countries, in sterling, and in francs. The original
weakness of sterling in neutral currencies would not have
affected the sterling-dollar rate directly, any more than it
affected the sterling-franc rate, and arbitrage opportunities
would have arisen which would have tended to make the
dollar move with the franc through the sale of neutral cur-
rencies for sterling, the sale of sterling for dollars, and the
sale of dollars for neutral currencies. In order to prevent
these deviations from the old system of rates, American credits
to England would have been necessary, and in addition cred-
its from neutral countries to support the whole sterling,
franc, dollar group.
Had British credits not been given, but the French pur-
chases in neutral markets nevertheless been made, the conse-
quences would have been the same, except that the first
deviations from the old system of rates would have been a
weakness in the franc and would have been concentrated in
the franc-neutral markets, and that this weakness would have
spread from the franc to the pound, rather than vice versa.
The tendency of the dollar would have been to move with
the pound, and ultimately balance of payments adjustments,
assuming an insistent French demand for goods in neutral
markets, would probably have forced the new system of
rates to resolve itself into a common depreciation of the franc
in terms of the dollar, the pound, and the neutral exchanges.
To summarize: The consequences of British loans to
France to finance French purchases in neutral countries were
to increase the pressure on America for loans to support the
sterling exchange, and at the same time to widen the geo-
graphical distribution of war-time international lending by
increasing the pressure for American borrowing from neu-
trals.
Had British credits not been extended the three possibili-
ties would have been:82 BREAKDOWN
i)forthe French purchases in neutral countries not to have
been made at all—an eventuality ruled Out by hypothesis;
2)fora new system of exchange rates to have been established
tending ultimately toward a general weakness of the franc in all
markets;
3)for American and neutral loans to be made to support the ex-
changes in the same manner as if the British credits had been
extended, but differently distributed. Such American loans to
support the exchanges would have been in contradiction to the
policy of the government as far as the use of the proceeds was
concerned.
The discussion of the three types of British loan to France
has revealed one situation in which no additional pressure
was brought upon America to make foreign loans, one in
which America was placed under pressure to lend to finance
purchases in her own market, and four situations in which
pressure was placed upon America to make loans to England
or France to stabilize the exchanges without direct reference
to American exports. If British credits were not forthcoming
to finance French purchases in England, then the repercus-
sions in the exchanges shifted the burden of financing these
purchases to America. If British credits were granted to fi-
nance French purchases in America, then the repercussions
in the exchanges placed America under pressure to make loans
to support the sterling exchange, to relieve England of the
burden she had assumed, and to make her an intermediary
in the transfer of American credit basically extended to fi-
nance American exports. If British credits were forthcoming
to finance French purchases in neutral countries, the reper-
cussions in the exchanges placed America under pressure to
extend credits to England to support sterling, and if they
were not forthcoming, America was placed under pressure to
make loans to France to support the franc.
These three cases are sufficient to illustrate the difficulties
of maintaining at one and the same time a free movement of
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rates, and a policy of restricting the use of the proceeds of
foreign loans to purchases of goods in the markets of the
lender The world-wide geographical distribution of goods
entering into international trade influences the exchange
rates in a host of different ways and thus gives the signals
that show that credit is needed to bridge the gaps in the ex-
change of goods. Under an international gold standard system
the whole functioning of the world credit structure responds
to these signals through the intricate mechanisms of banking
adjustment described in these studies. The credit that is
forthcoming is mobile and finds its way by devious channels
1:0 the original source of temporary lack of balance, whose
far-reaching repercussions are expressed in forms not easily
traceable. If the international credit required for the free
flow of goods in every direction is not made available, the
alternatives mentioned must be faced—either some of the
goods cannot move or the system of stable exchange rates can-
not be maintained. If the principle is rigidly applied, that
foreign làans shall be made only when the disturbances in the
exchanges that indicate they are needed happen to be directly
connected in the first instance with the trade of the credit
giver, then the free flow of goods is directly impeded. Gaps
in the international distribution of goods that do not arise
from the trade of the relatively few creditor countries are not
bridged by credit, and the resulting disturbances in the ex-
chang'es are not prevented.
Du:ring the war the double necessity of enabling goods to
move and maintaining a stable system of exchange rates as
far as possible was stronger than the principle of restricting
the use of the proceeds of loans to purchases in the lending
country. It is impossible of course to disentangle the effects of
these loans upon the exchanges during the war by an examina-
tion of the quotations. The operations in support of the ex-
changes were directed to resist pressures wherever they ap-
peared, including those resulting from the international lend-
ing itself. Because loans were made available to meet these84 BREAKDOWN
pressures, in spite of the desire of governments to restrict
their lending to a narrower basis, the effects of foreign loans,
as a time-bridging device filling the gaps in the balances of
payments in many countries, were diffused throughout the
world and lent support to a whole system of exchange rates.
They also influenced, in a manner to be described in the next
section, both the demand for and supply of bank credit in all
the countries adhering to this system of rates.
The Support of the Foreign Exchanges during the War
in its Relation to the Supply of and Demand
for Bank Credit
The effort to maintain the international gold standard as a
traditional system of rates had certain close connections with
the effort to preserve the gold standard as a domestic institu-
tion. These connections are found in the complicated in-
fluence that foreign exchange pegging exercised over the de-
velopment of the banking position both in countries with
weak and in those with strong exchanges. In discussing these
connections a sharp distinction has always to be borne in
mind between the effects of the accumulation of the resources
used in pegging upon the supply of bank credit and the ef-
fects of the success of pegging upon the demand for it.
Effects of the Accumulation and Use of the Resources em-
ployed in Pegging on the Supply of Bank Credit
As a general rule making payment for imports decreases de-
posits and receiving payment for exports increases deposits,
but this rule, like so many others, is subject to certain im-
portant exceptions.
When a country makes payment for its imports in a foreign
currency, its banks give up foreign assets and cancel part of
their own deposits by charging the importers' accounts, while
in the country receiving payment there is a transfer of de-
posits from foreign to domestic control through charges to
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When a country receives payment for its exports in a
foreign currency, its banks add to their foreign assets and
increa.se their deposits by crediting the accounts of exporters,
while in the country making payment there is a transfer of
deposits from domestic to foreign control, through charges to
the accounts of importers and credits to foreign banks.
The settlement of any single transaction therefore involves
a change in the amount of deposits in only one country, either
a decline in deposits in the importing country or an increase
in deposits in the exporting country. What is true of a single
import or a single export considered in isolation is true of the
total of imports and exports whose settlement involves changes
in the mutual indebtedness of the banking systems of the
countries concerned. For the bulk of imports and exports,
however, the interbank deposits cancel out, the settlement
results merely in credits to exporters and debits to importers
in each country, and the general rule applies. When balances
of international payments are in relatively stable equilibrium,
the few interbank deposits that do not cancel out act as
balancing items,5 appearing first on one side of the interna-
tional accounts and then on the other. These deposits form
part of the mobile international loan fund often referred to
in other parts of these studies. When the balancing item takes
the form of a reduction in the foreign assets of the banks of
the importing country this fund is reduced. When it takes
the form of an increase in the foreign assets of the banks of
the exporting country this fund is increased. When, as be-
fore the war, the balancing items are not all on one side of
the account and are reasonable in amount, fluctuations in
the size and distribution of this international loan fund and
its wise administration can provide an admirable instrument
for promoting stability in the exchanges.
When, however, a country finds that its imports tend per-
In statements of the international balance of payments increases in deposits
due foreigners and decreases in balances held abroad are exports. and the op.
changes in balances are imports.86 BREAKDOWN
sistently to exceed its exports, the balances owed by its own
banks to foreign banks tend to grow and• the deposits of
banks in foreign countries tend to expand. A point is soon
reached at which foreign owned deposits in the importing
country substantially exceed the amounts necessary for pur-
poses of clearing or other customary needs, and pressure for
their remittance home appears. Payment for part of the coun-
try's imports then takes the form of a net loss of foreign assets
and a net cancellation of domestic deposits, and consequently
in the exporter's country a net increase in foreign assets and
in domestic deposits is replaced by a transfer of deposits from
foreign to domestic control. Interbank deposits no longer
move in the direction required to prqmote stability of the ex-
changes, but in the opposite direction. Payment for imports
under these conditions involves a contraction in the credit
superstructure of the importing country, and is a deflationary
influence. It also results in pressure on the exchanges as the
banks in the importing country attempt to find some means
of replenishing their dwindling deposits abroad. The whole
mechanism of the adjustment of balances of payments not in
stable equilibrium comes into play at this point. If the needed
exports from the importing country are provided in the form
of gold the contraction in the credit superstructure already
taking place, will, for reasons to be discussed, probably not be
checked, and an added deflationary force, a contraction of
the credit base, may be added to it.
After the exchange deadlock largely caused by the calling
in of their foreign assets at the beginning of the war was
broken, Great Britain and the Allied Powers were countries
in this position. Their banking systems were under great
pressure to provide ever increasing credit facilities to their
war industries and their governments. The deflationary in-
fluence of continued payment for imports upon the super-
structure of credit could therefore at most be an offset against
a pressure for expansion. To allow the exchanges to depreci-
ate was contrary to the entire effort of war finance to preserve
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sible. To decrease imports and increase exports was to make
the conduct of the war more difficult. Goods and services
bought abroad were essential to the economic life and mili-
tary success of all belligerents. To divert home resources to
the production of exportable goods to pay for imports would
have weakeneçl their military power. The continued flow of
imports to the Allied Powers, while imports to the Central
Powers were seriously impeded, might easily become a deci-
sive factor in the whole struggle. Since neither deflation nor
depreciating exchanges were a remedy for their problems,
Great Britain and the Allies turned to the replenishment of
foreign balances and the building up of domestic bank de-
posits by finding exportable commodities that would not
weaken their material strength, to holding down the un-
avoidable increase in imports by selecting and controlling
them, and to foreign borrowing. The two great exportable
goods used for the replenishment of foreign balances were
gold and securities. The mobilization and export of securi-
ties performed not only this function but also that of build-
ing up domestic deposits in exactly the same way as any ex-
port commodity. The influence of foreign credits and gold
exports upon foreign balances and domestic deposits, how-
ever, is more complex and requires separate analysis.
EFFECTS OF GOLD EXPORTS ON THE CREDIT BASE AND CREDIT
SUPERSTRUCTURE
Gold exports and imports have, under certain circumstances,
a limilted power to induce or create transactions that appear
on the opposite side of the international balance of payments.
In thi:s they are not unique, but when they are functionally
related to important capital movements they become part of
a transaction that affects the credit base and credit superstruc-
ture differently from ordinary exports and imports of goods.
Moreover the majority of gold exports and imports are made
by banks acting as principals in the transaction, and this also
results in effects on the credit base and credit superstructure
which. differ from those of ordinary exports and imports.88 BREAKDOWN
When gold is exported by private boarders or by produc-
ers and sold for foreign currencies the gold appears as an
export and the increase in foreign balances as an import on
the country's statement of its international balance of pay-
ments. If these balances are retained or are used to buy se-
curities or other foreign assets a functional connection is
established between gold exports and certain particular im-
ports, and the gold shipment is part of a transaction that
swells both sides of the international account but does not
affect the bank deposits of the gold exporting country. If
the gold exporters bring home their foreign balances by sell-
ing them to banks in their own country, then both the do-
mestic deposits and foreign balances of these banks increase.
The banks may retain their increased foreign balances, em-
ploy them, or sell them to importers. To the extent that they
retain or employ them abroad the functional connection be-
tween the gold exports and a corresponding amount of the
country's imports is maintained and the increase in domestic
deposits continues. To the extent that they sell them to im-
porters the banks' domestic deposits and foreign assets are
reduced. If they sell all the new foreign balances to importers,
then the gold exports of the hoarders and producers have,
like other exports, made possible a corresponding amount of
imports without reducing the foreign currencies held by the
banks, domestic deposits, or bank reserves.
When gold is exported by banks as an arbitrage transaction
a different result follows. No functional connection between
gold exports and particular imports is possible, for remit-
tance home of the proceeds is essential to the completion of
the transaction. Since the banks have now entered the trans-
action as principals, the behavior of the credit base and credit
superstructure is also different. The sale of the gold in the
first instance reduces bank reserves and increases the banks'
foreign balances, but no one's account is credited since the
banks are themselves the exporters. Remittance home is ac-
complished by the sale of the foreign exchange to domesticPRESERVATION OF EXTERNAL FORMS 8g
importers whose bank accounts are debited. Like the gold
exports of hoarders or producers who have brought home
the proceeds of their shipments, gold arbitrage exports have
offset a corresponding amount of imports without affecting
the foreign assets of the banks of the exporting country. But
they have not left either the credit base or credit superstruc-
ture unchanged. The final result has been that both bank
reserves and domestic deposits have been reduced.
From the viewpoint of a gold importing country, of course,
gold is an import which, like all other imports, has to be paid
for. If, as was true of many gold imports into England during
and after 1933,itis bought by individuals and held by them
in domestic hoards, domestic bank deposits are reduced. This
is also true when the government is the purchaser, provided
the government pays in ordinary commercial bank funds and
holds the gold in treasury vaults or in inactive accounts in a
central bank. In either case it is correct to speak of the gold
as being, from a banking point of view, 'sterilized.'
6Ifthe
sellers, for example foreign hoarders or foreign producers, or
the foreign banks to whom the original sellers transfer their
deposits, do not remit the proceeds home, there is simply a
transfer of deposits from domestic to foreign control. In the
statement of the international balance of payments the gold
is an import and the increase in balances due foreigners an
export. If the new balances are employed in the purchase of
or other assets, the deposits are passed on to the
of these assets, which are then recorded as exports.
A functional connection has been established between gold
imports and certain particular exports, and the gold import
is part of a transaction that swells both sides of the interna-
tional. account but does not affect the bank deposits of the
gold importing country. If the gold sellers do remit the pro-
ceeds home, making payment for gold imports reduces do-
mestic deposits and the foreign exchange held by the banks
6Theonly real sterilization policy is the sale of imported gold, not to banks,
but to customers of banks (cf. Swedish policy during the war).90 BREAKDOWN
in exactly the same way as making payment for any other
import. Gold imports offset a corresponding amount of ex-
ports in the international balance of payments, without af-
fecting either the foreign currencies held by the banks, do-
mestic deposits, or bank reserves. These effects are exactly
the opposite of those that follow the export of gold by hoard-
ers and producers.
If, however, imported gold is bought by banks from foreign
hoarders, producers, or other sellers, a different result follows.
If the sellers do not remit the proceeds home both the deposits
and the reserves of the banks of the gold importing country
are increased. No one's account is debited, as in the case of
purchases by individuals or governments drawing on ordinary
commercial banking funds. Instead of a transfer of deposits
there is a creation of new deposits. The gold import becomes
part of a transaction that increases both sides of the interna-
tional balance of payments, but does not leave deposits un-
changed.7 If the proceeds of the sale of gold are not retained
in the gold importing country but are remitted home to the
sellers, then the newly created deposits are canceled and the
foreign exchange holdings of the banks are reduced. The
purchase of the gold and the remittance of the proceeds com-
bine to increase the reserves of the banks, and decrease their
foreign assets, deposits remaining unchanged. This cancels
the increase in foreign balances resulting from a correspond-
ing amount of exports, but does not cancel the increase in
deposits due to such exports. In the international balance of
payments gold imports offset a corresponding amount of ex-
ports, but the banking effects are not offsetting. The final
result is an increase in reserves and deposits, foreign exchange
remaining the same. These are precisely the effects that follow
when gold is imported as an arbitrage transaction.
The purchase of gold abroad by banks as an ordinary gold
Such a relationship between gold imports and the purchase of American se-
curities by foreigners was a subordinate feature of the American balance of
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arbitrage transaction is not functionally related to any item
in the export side of the international balance of payments.
It constitutes payment for current exports instead of being
part of a transaction that may swell both sides of the interna-
tional trading account because payment in foreign currencies
is essential to the completion of the transaction. To pay for
the gold the foreign exchange holdings of the banks are re-
duced, but no one's account is debited, for the banks are
themselves the importers. The banks' foreign exchange is re-
plenished by purchases from exporters whose transactions are
quite independent of the gold arbitrage operation. The final
result of the two parts of the operation is a net increase in
deposits and reserves, while foreign assets remain
unchanged; that is, the exact opposite of the final of
gold exports as an arbitrage operation.
Since these are the usual effects of gold arbitrage, it is often
asserted that gold exports decrease deposits and gold imports
.tncrease them, but this statement is elliptical and therefore
often misleading. It is indeed something of a paradox, for
other kinds of exports and imports are admitted freely to
have t:he opposite result. The paradox arises because it is easy
to fail to distinguish between the two parts of the completed
arbitrage transaction. Strictly speaking, the offsetting of ordi-
nary exports and imports in the international trade balance
by go].d bought and sold by banks has the effect of fixing
permanently in the credit superstructure a portion of the re-
duction in deposits resulting from imports and a portion of
the increase in deposits created by exports. These results fol-
low so].ely because gold is an imported or exported commodity
that is bought and sold by banks and not by customers of
During the war Empire gold was sold to the Bank of Eng-
8Goldshipped by governments and central banks for special purposes may
have the banking effects of an ordinary arbitrage transaction or of a purchase
from foreign hoarders who invest the proceeds in the importing country, de-
pending on the purposes of the shipments.92 BREAKDOWN
land for its own account or for the Treasury, and reexported
to other countries. The effects of the purchase were to in-
crease bank reserves and to fix in the British banking system
deposits. created by exports to the gold producing countries,
so far as these exports were not made by banks acting as
principals. Among the exports to the Empire were large in-
creases in Empire balances in London and reductions in Em-
pire debt to England, which illustrate the capacity of non-
arbitrage gold imports to induce to some degree offsetting
exports of certain types. To the extent, however, that Empire
indebtedness to London banks was reduced, the gold imports
from the Empire did not cause a corresponding increase in
English deposits, and consequently did not fully offset the
deflationary effects of the reexport of the Empire gold. The
import and reexport of Empire gold made it possible for
Great Britain to conserve foreign assets outside the Empire
(in this connection 'the Empire' stands chiefly for South
Africa and Australia) and to import goods from countries
outside the Empire without any reduction in bank reserves,
and with only a moderate reduction in deposits, by the use
of exports to the Empire. Other gold shipped by Great Britain
and other belligerents in support of the exchanges built up
foreign balances but diminished reserves and did not offset
the deflationary effects of imports upon the credit superstruc-
ture.
EFFECTS OF FOREIGN CREDiTS ON THE CREDIT SUPERSTRUCTURE
Gold and securities were not available in sufficient amounts
to maintain the sterling-dollar-franc foreign exchange nucleus.
They had from the outset to be supplemented in ever in-
creasing degree by credit. Credits accumulated abroad in
whatever form serve to increase the bank deposits of the
borrowing country. Import credits postpone the reduction of
bank deposits required by payment for imports. Export
credits anticipate the additions to domestic deposits created
by receiving payment for exports. Foreign credits thereforePRESERVATION OF EXTERNAL FORMS 93
tend to prevent deflationary pressure in a country whose im-
ports (exclusive of changes in balances) are regularly larger
than its exports.
Credits in the Form of Bank Balances. The simplest form
of obtaining credit abroad is to retain balances accumulating
under the control of foreigners as a result of their exports.
There is a certain flexibility in the relations between the
banking systems of countries with large international transac-
tions that makes possible modification, within limits, of the
ordin.ary effects of payment for goods shipped in international
trade. For, as already indicated, though payment for imports
always reduces bank deposits under domestic control, such
payment may be accompanied by either a reduction in foreign
assets or an increase in deposits under foreign control. Simi-
larly, though receiving payment for exports always increases
bank deposits under domestic control, it may be accompanied
by either an increase in foreign assets or a decrease in de-
posits under foreign control. The increase in deposits under
foreign control therefore is, within limits, a means open to a
country attempting to support its exchanges to offset the
reduction of bank deposits and the loss of foreign assets re-
sulting from an adverse balance of payments. This means was
used by England during the war. Because of difficulties in re-
mitting home, the expectation of a post-war return to 'normal'
exchange rates, and special inducements offered by British
banks, foreign balances accumulated in London far in excess
of the need for them (cf. Ch. 7)
Other Credits. The accumulation of balances in this way was,
of Course, but a small part of the total accumulation of credit
used. to support the exchanges during the war. A vast network
of new international indebtedness, in the form of open book
credit, bank loans, government advances, sale of treasury bills
abroad, and long term capital imports was built up. In all
these various forms it was essentially export credit, which
anticipated for longer or shorter periods the ultimate build-94 BREAKDOWN
ing up of the domestic bank deposits and foreign assets of
the banking systems of the borrowing countries through the
shipment of goods and the rendering of services. Because
these were the effects of retaining foreign-owned balances
and obtaining foreign credits, it was possible for belligerent
countries that had borrowed heavily in foreign markets to
import vast quantities of goods without reducing their own
domestic bank deposits. The actual payment for these imports
did reduce the foreign assets and deposits of these banking
systems, but they had previously been built up by various
forms of credit. The use of the proceeds of foreign credits to
pay for imports resulted in debits and credits of equal amount
on the books of the importing countries.9 In contrast, the
failure of the Central Powers to obtain sufficiently large
credits in the Netherlands, Denmark, and Sweden meant that
their imports from these countries, having to be paid for in
cash, had a deflationary effect in Germany and Austria-Hun-
gary.
One further effect of foreign borrowing upon the credit
superstructure should be noted. The building up of outstand-
ing foreign credits required the maintenance of more balances
by the borrowing countries in the lending countries. Ameri-
can foreign lending thus created a new requirement for the
maintenance of necessary balances in New York. As a by-
product of the use of credit to support the exchanges during
the war there grew up, in addition to the great sterling inter-
national loan fund, a second international loan fund in dol-
lars in New York.
EFFECTS OF PEGGING ON THE SUPPLY OF BANK CREDIT, SUMMARY
The accumulation and use of resources to support the ex-
changes added to the difficulties of maintaining the outward
aspect of the gold standard as a domestic institution in those
°Kirkaldy, cit., p. 71:"Whena loan is floated in the United States of
America and the credit to be created in America is drawn against to pay for
exports from the States to the United Kingdom, debits and credits of equal
amounts will be created on the books of banks in the United Kingdom."PRESERVATION OF EXTERNAL FORMS 95
countries whose exchanges were being supported. For it re-
duceci the credit base in those countries, and at the same time
prevented the credit superstructure from being diminished
by p2lyments for imports. The use of credit to support the
excha.nges may, on the latter account, be described as infla-
tionary. Under war conditions, however, exchange pegging
prevented the adoption of •other courses of action which
would probably have been even more inflationary in their
effects. In the absence of foreign credits the goods essential
for war would have had to be obtained in part from additional
drafts on domestic production, in part through the diversion
of banking resources to financing the production of goods for
export, and in part through the purchase of imports at con-
tinually rising cost because of a depreciating exchange. These
were the means to which the Central Powers had to resort.
In Great Britain it is almost certain that the tendency toward
domestic bank credit inflation that would have resulted from
such a course would have been greater than the inflationary
influence actually experienced through the acquisition of
foreign credits. In this sense it may be said that the accumula-
tion of foreign resources in support of the foreign exchanges
actually did, on balance, release the banking system of bur-
dens it would otherwise have had to bear. Foreign credits,
moreover, when extended to the British government• and
used by it to import goods that were subsequently sold to the
public, provided an admirable means for the transfer of pur-
chasing power from the public to the government.
Gold imports into countries whose exchanges were strong
had the inflationary effect of fixing in the credit superstruc-
ture deposits resulting from a corresponding volume of ex-
ports. Whether, aside from this, the receipt of gold, the pur-
chase of securities, and the provision of foreign credits by
such countries was an inflationary process depended upon
the use made of such gold as reserve, the sources of the pur-
chasing power used to buy the securities, and the manner in
whic:h the credits were granted.96 BREAKDOWN
Effects of Pegging on the Demand for Credit
Any judgment concerning the total effect of the process of
exchange pegging must take account not only of these factors
but also of the indirect influence of pegging upon the demand
for bank credit. The successes achieved in maintaining a sub-
stantial nucleus of relatively stable exchange rates not deviat-
ing far from the pre-war system of mint pars greatly influenced
the international distribution of the demand for bank credit.
They reduced the inflationary pressure of financing the war
in some countries and increased it in others. This they did
through their influence on prices.
It is, of course, true that the effort to peg the exchanges dur-
ing the war failed to hold price levels together because other
forces were too great. When in peace-time special influences
affecting the price levels of particular countries force them
out of relation to world prices, as in countries dependent on
a single crop or those subject to domestic political upheaval
or a deliberate inflationary policy, the gold standard as a
pegging device breaks down. During the war the importance
of supporting the exchanges was regarded as so gTeat that the
effort to peg the exchanges was continued even after large
differences between relative price levels and exchange rates
came into existence. There is no doubt, however, that the
price levels of countries whose exchanges were kept stable
were held more closely together than internal inflationary
forces of unequal strength would otherwise have allowed. All
prices are part of a general system and those directly affected
by exchange rates influence those which are not. The preser-
vation of the sterling-dollar-franc nucleus introduced into
the economy of the allied countries a volume of imports
whose cost was less than it would have been had the ex-
changes not been pegged.1° Yet owing to the elaborate system
1.0Theextent of this advantage is difficult to measure. Professor Harris has
shown that import prices do not adjust themselves completely to exchange de-
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cif import controls adopted by the government as part of
the technique of pegging, it did not cause a rush of imports
other than those needed for war purposes. On the other hand,
it discouraged exports and consequently reduced the scarcity
of goods within the allied countries which was at certain
times responsible in part for the tendency of their price
levels to rise.1' Exchange control therefore constituted on the
whole a check to rising prices in the allied countries. It con-
sequently reduced the demands for credit upon their bank-
:ing systems. At the same time, the effective demand for
American and neutral exportable goods was increased by the
pegging of the exchanges and this introduced an element
tending toward inflation in the United States and other
neutral countries. In this way part of the burden of financing
the war was transferred from the banking systems of the Al-
lies to the banking systems of the United States and in less
degree to those of the smaller neutrals by the mere fact of
relatively stable exchanges. This was; however, accomplished
at the cost of an increase in the internal dispersion of prices
which left a legacy requiring internal readjustment in the
post-war period. The pegging of the sterling-dollar rate made
it possible to introduce a large volume of relatively cheap
imports into England and therefore altered the distribution of
purchasing power within England. It helped to provide a
relatively intense demand for certain classes of commodities
in the United States and thereby altered the distribution of
purchasing power in the United States. It was not neutral in
to the formation of the internal price structure of
after September The greater the inelasticity of the supply of imported
commodities, the more important the market of the country with a de-
predated exchange to the producers of imported goods, and the more elastic
the demand of that country for imports, the less complete is this adjustment
likely to be. Cf. S. E. Harris, Exchange Depreciation(Harvard University
Press, 1936),pp.70—4.Duringthe war, however, the conditions leading to a
relatively restricted rise in import prices if the sterling exchange depreciated
were not present to the same degree as after September 1931.
11 Cf.S.E. Harris, Monetary Problems of the British Empire (Macmillan,
1931),pp.162if.98 BREAKDOWN
the two countries. Such effects are always present under the
international gold standard system and through them in part
the tendency of that system to bring the prices of all countries
to a common basis works itself out. When, as in the war, strong
tendencies are present leading toward unequal degrees of in-
flation arising from domestic causes and the exchanges remain
stable, their very stability introduces a dispersion of prices
within the various countries. It is the same phenomenon that
occurs when the exchanges are allowed to move rapidly while
there is no great tendency for inflation or deflation within
the various countries.12
12 Miss Dulles has admirably presented evidence bearing on this point drawn
from the behavior of internal prices in France after the war; op. cit., pp. 301—
This point also has a direct bearing upon the American monetary experi-
meiits of '933—34.CHAPTER 5
The Gold Standard as a Domestic Institution
during the War
During the war exchange pegging contributed to check the
movement of national price levels away from the positions
they occupied in 1914 relative to one another, and thereby it
redistributed the burdens of war financing and produced a
more even distribution of war-time inflation throughout the
world. The task of preserving the outward forms of the gold
standard as a domestic institution was to that extent made
easier in both belligerent and neutral countries. It was, how-
ever, made more difficult by the modifications in the actual
physical redistribution of gold that exchange pegging made
necessary.
The Physical Redistribution of Gold
The combined effect of the four currents of war-time gold
distribution (cf. Ch. 2) was to leave the banking systems of
most countries in possession of undiminished or increased
supplies of gold, and at the same time to divide both be!-
ligerent and neutral countries into five definite groups as far
as the behavior of their gold reserves was concerned. This is
shown in Table 4 in which the percentage changes in the
amount of gold held by the central banks and treasuries of
thirteen countries are grouped as follows:
')the principal financiers of the war
2)neutral countries not adopting successful gold repulsion poli-
and Japan




Gold Reserves of Selected Countries
Percentage Change during the War
CURRENCY DECEMBER PERCENTAGE
COUNTRIES BY GROUPS (millions) 1913 1918 INCREASE
I
United Kingdom Pound
Bank of England 35 8o 109
Bank of England plus
Currency Note Reserve 35 108.5 210
United States Dollar





Netherlands Bank 151 689 356
Spain Peseta
Bank of Spain 472 2,223 371
Japan Yen
Bank of Japan 285 733 157
Government plus Bank of
Japan 376 1,588 322
III
Sweden Krona
Bank of Sweden 102 286 i8o
Switzerland Franc 170 415 144
Argentina Peso
Caja de Conversion
In Argentina 233 279 20
In Argentina and in
legations abroad 233 379 63





In France 3,517 3,441 —2
In France and abroad 3,517 5,478 56
Italy Lira
Three Banks of Issue and
the Treasury
In Italy 1,493 1,054 —29
In Italy and abroad 1,493 1,642 10
Russia Rouble
In Russia
In Russia and abroad 125
V
Austria-Hungary Krone 1,241 262 —79
SOURCE: League of Nations, Memorandum on Currency and Central Banks, 1913-1925
II,34 if.
'July 1914—Oct. 1917; calculated from Table 6.PRESERVATION OF EXTERNAL FORMS 101
4)continental belligerents successful in preventing substantial
dissipation of gold reserves
5)continental belligerents unable to preserve gold reserves.
Changes in the physical quantities of gold held, in combi-
nation with very unequal rates of inflation, broke down in
many countries the pre-war relationship between and
the volume of notes and deposits. In some neutral countries
the accumulation of gold resulted in a very high set of reserve
ratios, while in some belligerent countries reserve ratios were
so reduced as to lose touch completely with pre-war norms.
Even in the latter, however, gold retained its place in the
banking and monetary system as evidence of the soundness of
central banks, as a symbol of national prestige, and as a
promise of a post-war return to normal. The general im-
portance still attributed to gold reserves in these respects is
attested in a letter written to President Wilson by Secretary
of State Lansing on September 6, 1915, and published in the
New York Times of January i1, 1935. Indiscussing the means
available to European countries for the payment of purchases
in America, Mr. Lansing wrote:
"It is estimated that the European banks have about three and a
half billions of dollars in gold in their vaults. To withdraw any
considerable amount would disastrously affect the credit of the
European nations, and the consequence would be a general state
of bankruptcy."
Dr. Blankart has presented the figures of the note issues,
gold reserves, and the ratios of gold reserves to note issues in
the major countries during the war. Since these figures are
all expressed in Swiss francs at pre-war gold parity, they make
possible direct comparisons between the various countries,
and provide the basic statistical background for a brief review
of the attitude of individual countries during the war toward
the gold standard. Such a review serves to break down Mr.
Lansing's generalization into its component parts and to em-
phasize the vitality of the concepts of gold as standard and
gold. as reserve during the war.102 BREAKDOWN
The Psychological Importance of Gold in Countries
in which Gold Reserves Steadily Declined
The gold reserve ratios of all the major continental bellig-
erents declined steadily and persistently, but none except
Austria-Hungary and Russia after the revolution of 1917 was
forced to abandon completely the facade of a gold standard.
France
In spite of the vigorous efforts made to concentrate, preserve,
and increase the country's stock, gold continued to represent
a continually decreasing percentage of the note issue of the
Bank of France. The legal limit of note issue was repeatedly
increased. By secret agreements made in 1911 the Bank of
France had undertaken, in case of a French mobilization, to
advance to the state 2,900 million francs, provided the law
was simultaneously altered to permit an expansion of note
issue of a like amount and to relieve the Bank of its obligation
to redeem its notes in gold. These agreements were approved
by the law of August 5, 1914, which raised the pre-war legal
limit from 6,8oo million to 12,000 million francs, and em-
powered the government to increase it still further by decree.
Within two months the new limit was reached, and decrees
of this sort became a regular feature of French finance until
this delegated power was withdrawn by the law of March 5,
1919.1
The persistent decline in the ratio of gold, even including
gold pledged abroad, to notes at the Bank of France from 59.7
to 17.7 per cent during the war (Table 5) caused grave con-
cern in France. It was regarded as a threat to the safety of the
French banking system and a blow to French prestige, even
though in a technical sense the ratio had lost all significance.
As early as 1915 the Bank of France declared in its annual re.
port that further demands for gold would endanger the
safety of the French banking system. Therefore when gold
'Jeze and Truchy, op. cit., pp. 229, 238.PRESERVATION OF EXTERNAL FORMS 103
had to be shipped to England in connection with the stabiliza-
l:ion of the franc in 1916 great care was taken to assure the
public that there was really no diminution in French gold
reserves. In speaking of this transaction M. Ribot said:
"England is anxious to augment her reserves of gold in order to
maintain her gold standard and to increase her credits in the
States. The Ban.k of France, even in the present phase of
the war has a gold reserve in excess of 4,000,000,000 francs. Con-
TABLE 5
BankFrance,Gold Reserves, Xote Issue, and Advances
(millionsof Swiss francs at par)
JULY END OF YEAR OCT.
1914 1914 1915 1916 1917 1918
GOLDRESERVES AND NOTE ISSUE
Note circulation 6,912 10,04213,30916,67922,33730,782
Gold at home 4,104 4,1585,0153,4893,315 3,406
Gold abroad 5922,037 2,037
Gold as percent-
age ofnotecirculation
exci. gold abroad 59.7 41.4 37.6 20.9 14.4 11.1
gold abroad 24.4 23.9 17.7
ADVANCES AGAINST WHICH NOTES WERE ISSUED
Advances of Bank of
France to:
French gOvernment200 4,1035,7017,60012,70019,000
AiLed governments 630i,8oo3,220 3,490
'rotal government ad-
vances for which notes
were issued 200 4,1036,3318,40015,92022,490
SOURCE: Blankart,cii., pp. 20-21
sequently, we are now in a position to promise England a con-
sum drawn from our own abundance; we shall put this
at the disposition of the British Treasury, and the Treasury
'will open a credit in our favor in London in pounds sterling.
The gold lent by us will reenter the coffers of the Bank of France
after the war." 2
.As late as the dark days of 1918 M. Clemenceau made an im-
passioned appeal for the preservation of the gold reserves of
France.
2 Blankart,. op. cit., p. '57 (our italics). M. Ribot wasspeakingof the results



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Germany and other Continental Belligerents
In Germany the greatest importance was attached to the pres-
ervation of the gold reserves of the Reichsbank. These were
steadily increased during the first half of the war and main-
tained approximately stationary thereafter. This was, how-
ever, accomplished only by measures that deprived the reserve
ratio of any real economic function in the banking system.
From the very outbreak of the war the old relationships of
the German note issue to gold were broken and means of
pyramiding the amount of notes issued against a given amount
of gold were quickly devised. The Reichsbank law was
changed to permit the Reichsbank to accept single name com-
mercial paper as part of its two-thirds reserve of paper against
notes. It was also provided that Reichskassenscheine and
Darlehenskassenscheine be counted as gold reserve, and the
four private note issuing banks were authorized to use Reichs-
bank notes as gold reserve. The course of note inflation and
the rapidly diminishing gold reserve ratio are shown in Table
6. In Italy and Russia the same motives were at work. Both
countries were able to prevent substantial dissipation of their
gold reserves during the greater part of the war (Table 6).
Until the revolution of 1917, Russia was even able to increase
her total reserves, if in her case, as in that of France, gold
held abroad is included in the figures. In Austria-Hungary
alone of the major belligerents the gold reserve could not be
preserved even as a confidence inspiring factor, owing to the
transfer of most of the gold reserves of the Austro-Hungarian
Bank to Germany in exchange for the latter's cooperation in
supporting the Austro-Hungarian as well as the mark ex-
change.
Increase in Gold Reserves in Neutral Countries
and Japan
In many neutral countries, on the other hand, the physical in-
crease in gold that resulted from the forces of war-time goldPRESERVATION OF EXTERNAL FORMS 107
distribution was more than sufficient to keep pace with the
concurrent expansion of credit (Table 6). This was true of
Spain, the Netherlands, and Argentina, as well as of Japan
(cf. Ch. 14),whoseeconomy was affected by the war in many
ways like those of neutral countries. Sweden, which took
definite steps to prohibit imported gold from affecting its
banking system, and Switzerland, which was forced by the
other countries of the Latin Monetary Union to accept pay-
ment for part of its export surpluses in silver and to meet a
large demand for gold for the arts, were exceptions. In both
countries the reserve ratios of the war years did not change
greatly. Gold was maintained in its traditional place in their
banking systems, at least in outward seeming.
The Gold Standard as a Domestic Institution in
Great Britain
It was of particular importance for the whole cause of the
Allies that confidence in the stability and strength of the
British banking system should be completely maintained.
The almost universal belief that the gold standard still existed
in Great Britain contributed powerfully to this feeling. The
persistence of this belief is not surprising, for the British
banking system was able to preserve the appearance of con-
tinuit.y of practice and stability through a combination of
factors which was not, perhaps could not, have been present
in other belligerent countries in the same degree. Exchange
pegging and price control reduced the demand for bank
credit in England as in other countries, but no other country
used the taxing power so ruthlessly or occupied so strategic
a position in the world-wide race for gold. The British people
transferred real resources to the government through taxes
and genuine lending from savings to a degree unequaled by
other peoples, and thereby relieved the government of the
necessity of forcing these transfers through inflation. The
British financial authorities used the available gold reserves
with great skill so as to contribute in maximum degree toio8 BREAKDOWN
the expansion of credit with a minimum of violence to the
traditional system of reserve ratios. At no time during the
war was there a premium on gold in England in the sense of
a distinction between gold and paper prices, such as appeared
in the United States during the greenback period.3 No official
action was taken which recognized or implied that Great
Britain was 'off'the gold standard. The exchanges were
pegged. Above all, the familiar accounting landmarks in the
banking system continued to give an appearance of solidity
in accordance with long established tradition.
The Reserves of the Bank of England and its Proportion
The first and most important of these accounting landmarks,
from a psychological point of view, were the gold reserves of
the Bank of England and its proportion.
It is not the intention of these studies to follow Professor
Harris and other investigators into the difficult realm of specu-
lative interpretation of the war-time changes in the Bank of
England's published statements. We shall merely indicate
briefly the manner in which the general aspect of that state-
ment was prevented, not indeed from showing serious strains
under the burden of war finance, but from giving any evi-
dence of an actual or potential loss of its traditional character.
The crisis of 1914,torecapitulate briefly, more than tripled
the Bank of England's 'other deposits' and reduced its re-
serves, and consequently reduced the proportion in the Bank-
ing Department from 52 to i8 per cent between July 22 and
August 26, 1914. The measures devised to meet the crisis in-
cluded, however, effective means for replenishing the reserves
and restoring the proportion. The device of issuing Currency
Notes relieved the Bank of England of the obligation of issu-
ing its own notes to meet the needs of additional circulation
and therefore removed a pressure upon the gold stock of the
Bank which would have made adherence to the conditions of
Cf. Harris, cit., pp. 3o8 if., for a discussion of the reasons why such a
premium did not appear.PRESERVATION OF EXTERNAL FORMS 109
the Peel Act and the preservation throughout the war of the
familiar appearance of the statement of the Issue Department
impossible. At the same time the transfer of gold from the
joint stock banks already mentioned helped to build up the
reserves of the Banking Department so that the proportion
reached 34 per cent on November i8, 1914.
Inthe first quarter of 1915,however,the proportion again
fell, reaching i8 per cent on March 31. The emergency ad-
CHART 2
Bank of England, Note Circulation, Coin and Bullion,










vances of the crisis were substantially reduced, but the conse-
queni; reduction in 'other deposits' was offset by a large in-
crease in 'public deposits' as a result of the receipt by the gov-
ernment of the proceeds of large popular war loans. At the
same time shipments of gold to support the exchanges and
U. S. .4 SiI,,r (Yo.ng 1025, S.n,I 9, V.1.1, pp. 4423110 BREAKDOWN
the setting aside of a gold reserve against Currency Notes
made such drafts on current gold accumulations that the
Bank's gold reserve was drawn down.
In the summer of 1915 the reserve was again replenished,
and the proportion rose to 30 per cent. In the autumn the
techniques for preventing wide fluctuations in thegovern-
ment's deposits at the Bank were perfected and 'public de-
posits' declined very sharply. The proportion, however,was
reduced to 22 per cent at the close of the year bya renewed
outflow of gold.
The reserve was for the third time replenished early in
igi6 and as deposits declined the proportionwas raised to 32
per cent by June 14. Once again, however, exports to support
CHART 3







theexchanges were required. The government was making
great demands upon the banks and late in December 'other
deposits' were sharply increased by open market operations.
The proportion gradually fell and at the end of the year was
only 181/2 per cent.
These declines in the gold reserves of the Bank of England
because of shipments in support of the exchanges caused
alarm, and voices were raised in protest, proclaiming that the
gold standard was in peril. It was even understood that one of
4The first deposit of gold in the Currency Note Account was made on Sep-
tember 9, 1914.Theamount was increased to £28,500,000 by May 12, 1915and
remained unchanged thereafter. Kirkaldy, cit., p.26, and p. 125,note.
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the reasons for the rise in Bank rate from 5 to 6 per cent on
July ]2, igi6 was to discourage an outflow of gold, though
at that time the bullion market was not functioning, and
England's gold was, in the quaint phrase of the Cunliffe Com-
mittee, being 'protected' by the submarine menace.
After America's entry into the war these periodic drafts
upon the Bank of England's gold reserve were not repeated.
The proportion was in fact stabilized at something under 20
per cent by additions to the reserve in rough proportion to
the increase in 'total deposits.' The growth of deposits, how-
ever, was very slight because a rise in 'other deposits' was off-
set by continued reduction in 'public deposits.' These changes
are readily traceable in Chart 2, showing the chief items in
the Bank of England statement, and Chartshowingthe
proportion in the Banking Department during the war. The
influence of gold exports upon the proportion of the Bank
of England is greatly magnified by the maintenance of virtu-
ally a ioo per cent gold reserve in the Issue Department. At
the close of 1918 metallic reserves were 32.6 per cent of notes
and other sight liabilities compared with 34.6 per cent at the
end of '9 13, while the proportion had been cut in half. Yet
there was little to alarm the average Englishman in the aspect
of the Bank statement or to raise fears in his mind concerning
the safety of the Bank, once he had become accustomed to a
stable proportion of 20 per cent instead of a stable proportion
of from 40 to 50 per cent.
Building an increased Credit Superstructure on the increased
Credit Base
In these ways the Bank of England was able during the war to
permit a rapid expansion in its 'other deposits,' which in-
cluded, probably as its main constituent, the growing balances
of the joint stock banks, without presenting a statement de-
structive of confidence in its own strength and 'soundness.'
The expansion of the joint stock bank balances at the Bank
of England was the result of a combination of factors, nearly112 BREAKDOWN
all of which contributed in greater or less degree to building
up their own deposits as well as to the preservation or in-
crease of their reserves. Among these were, of course, the
Bank's own purchases of securities, its advances, including
advances to the government, and gold deposited with it, with
the exception of gold already held by the joint stock banks
as part of their reserves at the outbreak of the war.
The relationship between government borrowing at the
Bank of England and the growth of bank credit was con-
trolled by the development of a complicated technique of
central bank administration of government funds. This tech-
nique played a major role in the history of credit control in
England, not only during but also after the war, and merits
the most careful consideration. During the war itself, the
creation and turnover of government deposits at the Bank
bore a threefold relation to the reserve position of the joint
stock banks:
i)TheTurnover of Bank of England Balances created by
Advances to the Government. Balances obtained by the gov-
ernment by borrowing at the Bank of England were paid out
by the government to its creditors and deposited by them in
the joint stock banks. This operation increased the deposit
liabilities and the balances at the Bank of England of the
joint stock banks in equal amount. It made available Bank of.
England funds which the joint stock banks could use as the
basis for making advances to the Treasury or for buying gov-
ernment securities. When they did so, Bank of England funds
were again made available to the government and joint stock
bank reserves were reduced. Fresh government expenditures,
however, again replenished the reserves of the joint stock
banks and again increased their deposits. The turnover of
Bank of England balances created by advances to the govern-
ment therefore resulted in the provision of new reserves for
the joint stock banks and the building up of their holdings of
government securities and their deposits from the public.
This process could be continued until the impetus of theOF EXTERNAL FORMS 113
origmal Bank of England advance to the government was
exhausted by the reestablishment of the customary reserve
ratios of the joint stock banks.
2) The Turnover of Bank of England Balances used to Pur-
chase Currency Notes. The transfer of joint stock bank bal-
ances at the Bank of England to the government through the
Currency Notes Account and their subsequent expenditure
by tlie government had the effect of providing the country
with hand to hand circulation without making any drafts
upon the reserves of the banks. The steps in this process were
very simple. The joint stock banks, upon feeling a demand
for currency from the public or themselves experiencing in-
creased requirements for till money owing to the expansion
of credit, the increase in business activity, and the rise in
prices, purchased Currency Notes from the government by
having their accounts at the Bank of England debited. The
Currency Notes Reserve Account was credited and the gov-
ernment replaced the Bank of England balances in that ac-
count with their own securities. The government then ex-
pended these balances and, as before, they returned to the
joint stock banks through the deposits of government credi-
tors. When Currency Notes were purchased to meet a de-
mand from the public, this turnover of deposits on the books
of the Bank of England had no net effect upon the reserves
and deposits of the joint stock banks, but relieved them from
a pressure they would otherwise have been sub-
jected to. While the deposits of the government creditors
were built up the deposits of those who had withdrawn cur-
rency for hand to hand circulation were reduced. At the
same time joint stock bank reserves at the Bank of England
remained intact, having been drawn down to purchase Cur-
rency Notes and replenished by the deposits of checks drawn
by the government. The process created therefore an increase
in the public debt in the form of government paper money
outstanding in the hands of the public without trenching at
all upon commercial banking reserves, or, except in the case114 BREAKDOWN
of an increase in till money, expanding bank credit. This
process rendered unnecessary the original plan for the issue
of Currency Notes to the banks under the form of advances of
not more than 20 per cent of their capital and surplus and
bearing 2 per cent interest. When the Currency Notes pur-
chased were held as till money by the joint stock banks both
the cash component of their reserves and their deposits were
increased.
3) The Turnover of Bank of England Balances lent to the
Government through Special Deposits. Beginning in March
1916 the Bank of England offered to 'borrow' from the joint
stock banks some of the foreign balances that were accumu-
lating with them as part of the process of supporting the
exchanges. This transaction took the form of three day loans
to the Bank, which were given the name of 'special deposits,'
and these special deposits were re-lent by the Bank to the
government. The method by which this double operation was
dealt with in the accounts of the Bank of England has not
been made public. The 'special deposits' did not appear as
such in the published statements of the Bank, nor were the
corresponding loans to the government separately recorded.
These loans may have been included in the annual statement
of the Bank under the heading 'exchequer bills purchased,'
or the whole transaction may simply have been carried in a
memorandum account.5 Whatever the accounting treatment,
the 'lending' of foreign balances by the joint stock banks to
the government through the Bank of England as intermediary
must have been an operation that in the first instance reduced
'other deposits' at the Bank, while the subsequent expendi-
These suggestions are made in Harris, op. cit., p. andKirkaldy, op. cit.,
p. 44. Professor Harris has made the following estimate in millions of pounds
sterling (op. cit., pp. 56—7)ofthe amount of the special deposits:
1919 1919 1919
Jan.5, rgi6 o April 12199 June 30469 Sept. 13157
1917 65 May 3 212 July12635 Sept. 20201
1918 125 May3! ig6 July19485 Oct. 1'
1919 182 June7 308 July 26319 Oct. z8 92
June14.383 Aug. 206 Oct.25 14
June21435 Sept. 6178 Nov.i 14PRESERVATION OF EXTERNAL FORMS 115
ture of the Bank of England funds so received by the govern-
ment must have increased 'other deposits1 again. The final
outcome was as if the joint stock banks had purchased securi-
ties directly from the government, and the government had
spent 'the proceeds. It was a turnover of Bank of England
funds that had the effect of keeping joint stock bank reserves
with the Bank of England unchanged while at the same time
buildmg up joint stock bank deposits. The increase in the
deposits of government creditors in the joint stock banks,
however, was not offset, as in the case of the issue of Cur-
rency Notes to the public by a reduction in the deposits of
other customers. It was offset by a new asset, namely 'special
deposits at the Bank of England.' This asset was treated by the
joint stock banks either as 'cash' or as 'money at call and short
notice,' and therefore it did increase their actual reserves and
permitted a still further secondary expansion of bank credit.6
These three operations had one feature in common. They
placed the government in control of deposits at the Bank of
England which were thereupon converted into deposits with
the joint stock and other banks by being spent by the govern-
inent. But in other respects their results were different.
The first operation increased the balances of joint stock
banks at the Bank of England and increased their deposits.
It was an inflationary operation increasing the credit base and
the credit superstructure in equal amount.
The second maintained the balances of the joint stock
banks at the Bank of England and maintained their deposits
by relieving them of the burden of providing hand to hand
circulation to the public. When new Currency Notes were
6 Kirkaldy points out that during igi6 the cash items of the joint stock banks
increased £95 million, whereas their balances in the Bank of England in-
(Teased only £14 million and probably their additional reserves of Currency
Notes increased not over £20 million. This leaves about a £61 million increase
iii cash to be explained. At the same time, in the government accounts, Ways
and Means Advances increased more rapidly than government securities in the
Bank of England. The condusion follows that the joint stock banks considered
as cash the loans they had made of spare balances to the government through
the Bank of England. Harris, op. cit., p. 52; Kirkaldy, op. cit., pp. 83 if.ii6 BREAKDOWN
added to till money this operation increased both the cash
and deposits of the joint stock banks. It was an inflationary
operation because it removed a very important check upon
the expansibility of the banking system.7
The third maintained the balances of the joint stock banks
at the Bank of England and increased their deposits. It also
increased either their cash or their secondary reserves, depend-
ing on whether 'special deposits' at the Bank of England were
TABLE 7
Joint Stock Banks of England and Wales (except Bank of
England), Reserves and Deposits, 1913-1918
1(millions of pounds)
1913 1914 ff915 1916 1917 zg'O
rDeposits and current ac-
counts 809.4895.6992.6"54.91,365.31,583.4
2 Cash and at Bank of Eng-
land 115.8169.9179.0 248.0238.5270.1
3Money at call and short
notice 120.1106.283.5 121.5 189.4 211.1
4 Percentage line 2 is of I 14.319.0i8.o 21.5 17.5 17.2
5Percentage lines 2 plus 3
is of 29.230.826.5 32.0 31.3 30.4
SOURCE:TheEconomist,Vol. 78, 8o, 82, 84, 86, 88, Banking Supplement, May
1914-19
1 Mostof these figures are as of Dec.x, though a few balance sheets, of relatively
minor importance, are included as of other dates during the year.
treated as 'cash' or as 'money on call or short notice.' It had
therefore an inflationary effect similar to the first.
There was one other means by which the joint stock banks
were able to increase their reserves. This was by an increase
in the float which accompanied a rising level of prices and
great activity of busiPess.
Cf. the excellent treatment of the difference in the American banking system
between the legal powers of expansion permitted by the Federal Reserve Act
and the practical limits imposed by the necessity of providing an increased
note circulation when bank credit is expanding in Rufener, Money and Batik-
ing (Houghton, Mifflin, 1934),pp.562 if. The American example is the most
suitable for the exposition of this point because the legal reserve requirements
permit a certain definiteness in the calculation impossible under the British
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In these ways the reserves of the British banks kept pace
(as shown in Table 7) with the demands made upon them by
the requirements of war finance, and their deposits were in-
creased seven times as fast as during the average pre-war years
without undue change in their customary reserve ratios. An-
other of the great accounting symbols of a banking system
sound in accordance with long established tradition was thus
preserved in England during the war.
'The Ratio System of the Joint Stock Banks
For a decade before the war the joint stock banks had main-
ttained. their 'cash' plus 'money at call and short notice' at
'rABLE 8
7oint Stock Banks of England and Wales (except Bank of England),
Principal Assets as Percentages of Total Deposits, 1913-1919 (mit-
lions of pounds)





2 is of i 66.76i.850.7 47.0 50.2 52.7 60.3
4 Cash and money
at Ca].! and short
236.0276.0262.5369.5427.9481.2452.8
Percentage line
4 is of i 29.230.826.5 32.0 31.3 30.4 24.2
6 Investments 121.2146.5310.8323.0339.7 347.2398.6
Percentage line
6 is of i 15.016.431.3 28.0 24.9 21.9 21.3
souRcE: TheEconomist, Vol.1io(1930), Banking Supplement, May io, p. i8
close to 28 per cent of their 'total deposits.' They had an un-
usually strong reserve position in 1913 when this ratio was
29.15 per cent. All through the war, except during 1915, it
was even higher; over 30 per cent. In 1915 it was 26.5 per
cent, only slightly below the average for the pre-war decade
and above that of the decade preceding. Moreover, the 1915ii8 BREAKDOWN
decline was caused not by a drop in primary reserves but
wholly by a drop in secondary reserves, 'money at call and
short notice.' It was a reflection of the response of the joint
stock banks to the government's demand for accommodation
through the purchase of government securities (Chart 46).
For the same reason certain of the other customary ratios of
the joint stock banks changed radically in 1915. The ratio of
'investments' to 'total deposits' rose from 16.4 per cent in
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advances'to 'total deposits' fell from 6i.8 to 50.7perCent.
During the ensuing years of the war these two ratios began
moving back to their pre-war magnitudes. Many changes in
government financing contributed to this result. The short
term debt was built up and treasury bills came in increasing
amounts to the joint stock banks through the discount mar-
ket. A better system of distributing government securities to
investors was developed. Bank funds were liberally used to
assist purchasers of government bonds, and government bonds
became an increasingly important type of collateral for bank
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advances.The tendency to restore the pre-war ratio system
was accelerated after the actual close of hostilities. By 1919
publishedstatements of the joint stock banks showed the
results of war finance in a great increase in all the major
items,. As far as the distribution of assets is concerned, they
did not differ very greatly from the statements of pre-war
years. Before the war the relative rigidity of this system of
ratios was important in increasing the control of the Bank
of England over credit. It was at the heart of the stable credit
conditions in Great Britain which contributed so much to
the 'perfection' of the international gold standard system of
pre-war days.
The war-time disturbances in the ratio system of the British
joint stock banks and the tendency toward a return to the
pre-war 'normal' after the first shocks of the war were met
are shown in Table 8 and Chart 4.
The Gold Standard as a Domestic Institution in the
United States
The gold standard in America proved to be a flexible and ex-
pansible instrument under the extraordinary conditions pre-
vailing during the war. From June 30,1914 toJune 30, 1918,
American banks increased their cash assets(cash and due
from banks)133percent and their deposits 152 per cent.
Commodity prices meanwhile more than doubled. For a
country on the gold standard to increase its total deposits one
and one half times and to double its commodity prices in
four years is truly remarkable. Yet no question ever arose in
the public mind that the American gold standard "in its full
integrity... wasever in danger"(cf. Ch. 2, note i).In
America, alone among the major financiers of the war, the
joint process of gold accumulation and concentration more
than kept pace with the war-time increase in the credit super-
structure. There was never a shortage of reserves to meet the
requirements of law and of tradition.120 BREAKDOWN
Surplus Gold in the United States
The three reasons for this abundance of reserves were:
i)the outbreak of the war at a moment when the Federal Re-
serve Act had just reduced the legal reserves required of the com-
mercial banks of America by probably as much as $400 million 8
2)the command of the United States over the gold of the bellig-
erent world, in combination with the defenses introduced against
losses to the neutral world, which increased the monetary gold
stock of the country i6o per cent
thepassage of amendments to the Federal Reserve Act in
June 1917, which increased the amount of notes and deposits that
could be legally created upon a given amount of gold.
During the entire war both the gold reserves and the de-
posits of the Federal Reserve banks grew rapidly, and it was
characteristic off the Federal Reserve banks to have an 'excess'
gold reserve over requirements as shown in the accompanying
table.
Ratio of Total Cash Reserves to Xet Deposit and Federal Reserve
Liability Combined of the Twelve Federal Reserve Banks
PER PER PER PER
1914 CENT 1916 CENT 1917 CENT 1918 CENT
Dec. 3195.5 March3z73.9 March3086.2 March 2962.7
1915 June3071.2 June 2972.4 June 2861.7
March26 89.3 Sept. 68.g Sept. a876.4 Sept.2751.6
July 25 93.8 Dec. 29 66.2 Dec. 2861.3 Dec. 2750.6
Sept. 2489.7
Dec. 3086.7
The steady decline in this ratio does not measure the decline
in the cash basis of bank credit in the United States until
nearly the end of the war. These were the years of the build-
ing up of the Federal Reserve system. Member bank deposits
with the Reserve banks were becoming a rapidly increasing
proportion of total bank reserves, and the deposits of member
banks were simultaneously becoming a rapidly increasing
proportion of the bank deposits of the whole country (Chart
37). By igi8, however, the growth of the member bank re-
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serves and deposits exhibited the same characteristics as that
of the reserves and deposits of all the banks of the country
and was the dominant influence in that growth. For that
reason the power of the banking system to expand in con-
sonance with the requirements of the gold standard is re-
flectecE accurately in the reserve position of the Federal Re-
serve banks from that time on. The presence, therefore, on
November 29, 1918, of an 'excess' gold supply above legal re-
quirements of $509 million in the hands of the Federal Re-
serve banks may be considered as the most striking visible
proof of the exuberant capacity of the gold standard as a
domestic institution in the United States to live and flourish
in an inflationary environment.
Building an increased Credit Superstructure on the increased
Base
'The deposits of member banks with the Federal Reserve
banks, like those of the joint stock banks with the Bank of
England, were built up by the deposit of gold and by the
of securities by the central bank. They were not,
howe'ver, expanded as a result of the turnover of balances
created at the Federal Reserve banks by advances to the gov-
ernment. Nor were the American banks relieved of the drain
upon them created by supplying hand to hand currency. The
issue of Federal Reserve Notes to the public continued to
cause an equal reduction in member bank reserves and de-
posits. On the other hand, the American banks had direct
access to central bank credit through the rediscount of corn-
inercial paper, largely secured by government bonds, and
through borrowing on their own notes secured by government
bonds. This access was made progressively easier by changes
in banking law and in the interpretation of banking law
under the ever increasing demands of war finance.
In these ways American banks were able to maintain with-
out difficulty the increasing legal reserves required of them by
an increasing deposit liability. The contribution of the fiscal122 BREAKDOWN
operations of the government to the growth in this deposit
liability was both vast in amount and original in technique.
On December 1, 1917 the credit resources of the Federal
Reserve system—Federal Reserve banks and member banks
together—employed by the government are estimated to have
been $2,563 million and on December 1, 1918, $5,736 million.0
This was accomplished partly through direct investments by
the banks in government securities and partly by loans to
customers against government securities as collateral. The
deposit liability standing over against this great direct and
indirect investment of bank credit in government securities
forms part of, but does not measure completely, the contribu-
tion of government fiscal operations to the increase in bank
deposits.
It was the aim of the United States Treasury Department to
prevent government borrowing operations and the adminis-
tration of government funds from disturbing the money mar-
kets. For this purpose the Treasury endeavored to transfer
the fluctuations in its cash balances from the Federal Reserve
banks to the commercial banks. A new system of depositary
banks therefore was created. Government deposits were built
up in these banks through the redeposit in them of the pro-
ceeds of government securities, paid for by subscribers in cash.
Depositary banks, moreover, were allowed to pay for their
own subscriptions and for those made on behalf of their
clients by credit on their books. No reserves were required
against government deposits thus created. This procedure
made it easy for banks subscribing to government bonds to
create entirely new deposits against these bonds, and thus
to place the government in possession of bank funds created
ad hoc and not transferred to the government from already
existing deposits. These new deposits were put into circula-
tion by being transferred to the government's account at the
Federal Reserve banks and checked out by the government
to meet its expenses. They reappeared in the banking system
°Beckhart,op. cit.,IV,gig.Theestimate is the writer's.PRESERVATION OF EXTERNAL FORMS 123
as ordinary deposits of the government's creditors. They were
thereby transformed from deposit credit requiring no reserve
to deposit credit requiring reserve, and at this point a basic
conn€ction between government fiscal operations and the
gold concentration policy was established. When and to the
extent that it was used in this manner, the special depository
system was an effective, simple, and inconspicuous inflation-
ary device through which the growth of the public debt in
America contributed to the increase in American bank de-
The successive stages in the expansion of the credit super-
structure in the United States during the war are shown in
Appendix Table i.FromJune 30, 1915toJune 30,1917,
whenAmerica was well established as a supplier of the war-
ring nations and gold was flowing into the country the ex-
pansion of investments kept pace with that of deposits, but
the expansion of loans and discounts did not. The effect of
gold imports in fixing in the credit superstructure a large
'volum.e of deposits created by exports is clearly apparent in
the decline of loans and discounts as a proportion of deposits.
From June 30,1917to June 30,igig,which included most of
America's active participation in the war, total loans and in-
vestments again approached their pre-war relationships to de-
posits, but investments grew much more rapidly than loans,
largely owing to the progressive application of a quota sys-
tem under which the banks were obliged regularly to place
a fixed proportion of their deposits in government certificates
of indebtedness. Loans and discounts consequently declined
still further as a proportion of individual deposits.'° The
granting of government loans to Great Britain and the Allied
I'owers was responsible for a large part of the growth of the
American public debt, and therefore for the quota system
i:rnposed on the banks as part of the marketing machinery for
From1914toigig deposits other than inter-bank deposits increased 8i6
per cent., and loans plus investments increased 79 per cent, but investments
increasei i,8per cent and loans only 62.9 per cent.124 BREAKDOWN
American government issues. The support of the exchanges,
therefore, by gold imports before and by government loans
after America entered the war, contributed substantially not
only to the increase in total American bank deposits, but also
to the change in the ratios between loans, investments, and
deposits of American banks.CHAPTER 6
The General Significance of the Effort to Preserve
Gold Standard Forms in War Time
The fundamental social and economic function of and justi-
for the gold standard is that it facilitates the domestic
and international exchange of goods. The great effort put
forth during the war to preserve as far as possible the external
forms of the gold standard was an effort to make the gold
standard do in war what it had done in peace. The traditional
means of gold standard adjustment were employed on a scale
never before witnessed, but because the domestic exchange
of goods in belligerent countries was dominated by the neces-
sity of diverting productive powers to making war supplies
and maintaining military forces, and the international ex-
change of goods was dominated by the overwhelming need of
belligerents for imports, these means had to be used with an
almost total disregard of long run consequences.
The Use of Gold
Confidence in the 'soundness' of money and in the stability
of domestic credit was essential to facilitate the domestic ex-
change of goods. To preserve this confidence and to promote
this stability, gold was concentrated in the hands of govern-
ments and central banks in order to increase, or to prevent
the dissipation of, gold reserves. At the same time, gold re-
serve requirements were not allowed to interfere with the
degree of inflation necessary to force the application of human
and material resources into the channels required by war. In
the building of the credit superstructure upon the available
credit base long run considerations of the effects of domestic
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inflation were swept aside. The dangers that such inflation
entailed were merely masked in varying degree by conserving
or building up visible gold supplies.
The maintenance of stable exchanges was essential to facili-
tate the international exchange of goods. To supporL the ex-
changes, gold was used to an unprecedented extent as a means
of international payment for goods. The refined technique
by which it had served as one of the marginal balancing items
in international settlements was modified or abandoned. The
long run relationships previously existing between the inter-
national distribution of gold and the varying rates of growth
of the banking systems of the world were superseded by a
new international concentration of gold holdings. For the
same reasons, the considerations that had long governed the
distribution of international credit were disregarded.
The Use of International Credit
The use of international credit during the war was, on the
whole, inflationary in its direct effects upon the world's bank-
ing systems. It was part of the grand total of war-time infla-
tion. Through a complicated interaction of prices arising
from international trade between countries whose exchanges
were pegged but which were subject to very unequal inflation-
ary pressure at home, this total war-time inflation was dis-
tributed more evenly through the world than it would have
been had the exchanges been free. The use of international
credit to support a nucleus of stable exchanges therefore con-
tributed indirectly to the international spread of war-time
inflation as well as to its total amount. Furthermore, during
the war foreign lending was not, in a true sense, a time-
bridging credit operation, for foreign loans were made with-
out primary consideration for the requirements of repayment.
Before the war foreign lending was, in the main, carried
out under expert banking direction and with detailed con-
sideration of the prospects and means of repayment. Foreign
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ofgoods through an international distribution of accumu-
]ated savings and of bank credit granted in accordance with
banking principles. They were therefore not inflationary in
the lending countries. They expanded the superstructure of
bank credit in the borrowing countries and thereby enabled
them to import goods without a decline in bank assets and
bank deposits. This new bank credit was utilized to finance an
increase in production from which an increase in exports
was expected that would create bank deposits and bank assets
with which to repay the loans. The expansion of bank credit
in the borrowing countries through loans was merely an
anticipation of its expansion through exports. Under these
conditions foreign lending performed the economic function
of facilitating long term growth in international trade with-
out inflation and without sacrifice of the stability of the ex-
changes. During the war there was no room for the forward
Looking banking point of view. It could not dominate inter-
national lending. To a large extent the resources from which
:Eoreig:ri loans were made were drawn from domestic credit
:inflation, particularly in the United States, instead of from
:past savings. In the borrowing countries these loans expanded
the credit superstructure and production. But they ex-
panded production in a way that accentuated certain pre-war
i:rends of economic strain and undermined the basic balance
of the world's exchanges of goods. These loans, therefore,
were not productive of the means of repayment. They could
not, under the circumstances, take into account the impera-
tive but delayed requirement of all truly time-bridging inter-
national financial operations, namely, the long run assimila-
tiontheir repayment and service into the economic bal-
ance of the unknown future.
Carrying forward Unsolved Economic Problems
The maintenance of some of the external forms of the gold
standard during the war facilitated the domestic and inter-
national exchange of goods and inspired confidence in banks128 BREAKDOWN
and in money. Because it accomplished these objectives only
by disregarding the long run consequences of the means em-
ployed, certain grave problems were left over for the post-war
period. Many were still unsolved in 1925, but this fact was
masked by the seemly and comfortable facade of the gold
standard. Indeed a somewhat unexpected similarity may be
noted between the gold standard of 1925—28 and of 1914—18.
As was true during the war, a force of unusual strength tended
to compel the extension of a large volume of international
credit. The productive capaCity of the United States and other
countries had become adjusted to an export market first
created by the war and then restricted by many post-war re-
adjustments. Though not as powerful as the need of importers
during the war, this need of exporters for markets was a
strong motive for the use of the methods of financial adjust-
ment characteristic of the gold standard after 1925 in a way
appropriate to the needs of the moment but not to the slow
and even development of a balanced international economy.
The capacity and willingness of the American banking sys-
tem to respond to that need translated this motive into action.
The international exchange of goods was facilitated from
1925 to 1928 as it had been from 1914to1918. Confidence
was maintained. When, however, in 1928 a combination of
causes cut off the supply of loans from the United States,
which had served the requirements of American export trade,
the inflationary process to which these loans had contributed
was brought to an end and underlying economic weaknesses
disclosed. The results were similar to those which followed
the war itself.'
For the interpreter of the international gold standard both
the similarities of and the contrasts between these two periods
are of the utmost significance. They demonstrate that finan-
cial adjustments which, when utilized as part of a world-wide
credit and banking system operating in a gradually develop-
tThis comparison is drawn fully in Ch. 21,Carryingforward Unsolved Eco-
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ing economic environment and under centralized control by
a country with a fundamentally strong basic pull on all other
excha:nges, give both flexibility and stability to the world,
cannot be used with the same results under different con-
ditions no matter how compelling the economic pressure.
They suggest that the fundamental problem of reestablishing
the gold standard after the war was to adjust a changed in-
stitutional financial structure to a changed economic environ-
ment. It is because of the profound influence of the war upon
both that we have not called 1914—19aperiod of 'Suspension
and Modification,' but rather a period of 'Breakdown.'